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The U.S. Navy Human Resource Management Support System
(HRMSS) has been in operation in various forms throughout
the naval establishment since 1971. To date approximately
50% of the Navy's operational commands have been exposed to
HRMSS concepts and practices via the mechanism of a Human
Resource Availability (HRAV). At this juncture, however,
little has been done to evaluate the operational impact of
the HRAV in those commands that have experienced the process.
This study proposes a methodology with which the
effectiveness of the HRAV process as currently used by
HRMC/D's can be assessed. The study further proposes a
methodology with which to determine the impact of the HRAV
on improved unit performance and operational capability.
Use of the methodology is anticipated to aid system managers
at all levels to evaluate the product as well as to aid
future policy and resource allocation decisions for the HRMSS
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A. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING
The U.S. Navy Human Resource Management Support System
(HRMSS), instituted within the Navy in 1971, is essentially
a set of programs by which Navy leadership and management
personnel at all levels can achieve maximum efficiency and
effectiveness in the use of resources to effect mission
accomplishment. The HRMSS focuses its effort on the Navy's
human resources. It recognizes that if Navy personnel (both
military and civilian) are led and managed effectively, the
efficient and effective use of material and money will follow
as a desirable end. That is to say, if Navy personnel are
led and managed effectively there will be a desire among all
personnel, as well as appropriate methodology, to want to
provide their best performance using all the resources they
have at their disposal.
The HRMSS recognizes the importance of the individual.
As a desired result of HRMSS application the individual
recognizes that the organization of which he is a part is
concerned about him as an individual. Because of this and
other factors the individual may be motivated to provide his
best performance to the organization. Ideally the individual
knows his job, recognizes the importance of his job to
overall mission accomplishment, and appreciates that he is an
important part of the command team.

This situation further allows the Navy man or woman the
opportunity to participate fully in the operation of the
command to which they may be assigned for duty. Furthermore
it allows the individual to rise as high in the organization
at large as individual ability and initiative permit.
After two years of development as a formal project under
the auspices of the Chief of Naval Personnel, the U.S. Navy
Human Resource Management Support System was operationally
implemented under the cognizance of the major fleet commanders
in chief on 1 January 1974. Prior to this date Human Resource
Development Centers (HRDC's) were strategically located at
major U.S. Navy concentration points in the continental U.S.
and Hawaii. These HRDC's (later Human Resource Management
Centers (HRMC's)) were located at Newport, R.I., Norfolk, VA.,
San Diego, CA . , and Pearl Harbor HI. were staffed by officer
and enlisted personnel who had formerly occupied normal Navy
operational billets.
Initial manning for the HRMC's was accomplished by a
careful screening of personnel records. Prospective selectees
for HRMC billets were then interviewed to determine their
desire to serve in these billets. After selection and
interview, personnel who elected to remain in the system were
intensively trained to provide HRMSS services to operational
Navy commands in one of the five following areas:

1 . Original Subprograms of the HRMSS
a. Human Resource Management consisting of:
(1) Organizational Development and Management
to provide commands with assistance of trained specialists in
organization development to assist a command in increasing
the overall performance of its personnel towards mission
attainment and overall command excellence.
(2) Intercul tural Relations - to provide
commands assistance in formulating local policies concerned
with all aspects of operating near or visiting foreign host
nations.
(3) Race Relations - to provide command
personnel training by conducting Race Relations Education
seminars and workshops.
(4) Drug and Alcohol Education - to assist
commands to develop, promote, implement, monitor, and evaluate
programs in drug and alcohol education onboard.
b. Equal Opportunity:
The U.S. Navy's Equal Opportunity Plan extends
the Navy's Affirmative Action Plan of 1971. The plan and its
implementation are designed to make the Navy a model of equal
opportunity for all, regardless of race, sex, creed, or
national origin, while maintaining full effectiveness in the
performance of the primary Navy missions.
10

c. Drug Abuse Control and Alcoholism Prevention:
Affirmation of the Navy's recognition of the
social problems of drug and alcohol abuse and its responsi-
bility to actively participate in control and rehabilitation
efforts .
d. Career Motivation:
Commitment by the Navy to the goal of greater
utilization of its human and physical resources to maintain
full effectiveness in the performance of its primary mission
and dedication to improvement of the life of ewery man and
woman in the Navy.
e. Transition/Second Career Planning and
Assi stance :
The provision of individual assistance for a
Navy man or woman to make a smooth transition when returning
to civilian life from a period of military service. [Ref. 1]
These subprograms were all developed individually and
parallel to one another as the leadership of the Navy
recognized their significance. They were all brought together
under the auspices of the Human Resource Development Project
Office in the Bureau of Naval Personnel in 1971. This project
office was especially created to bring together the diverse
program areas under a central leadership structure.
Upon implementation under the various fleet commanders
in chief, and through subsequent development and consolidation
efforts, the following related events have occurred:
11

1. Consolidation of existing HRMC's to Norfolk, VA
,
San Diego, CA , and Pearl Harbor, HI. Each HRMC is responsi-
ble for a specific geographical area under its respective
fleet commander in chief.
2. Establishment of HRMC London, U.K. under the
cognizance of CINCUSNAVEUR , and the establishment of HRMC
Washington, D.C. under the cognizance of a newly created
office within OPNAV (0P-01P). The Washington HRMC is primarily
responsible for providing HRMSS services to units within the
U.S. Navy shore establishment while the London center provides
services in the Mediterranean area.
3. Establishment of several local Human Resource
Management Detachments (HRMD's) under the operational control
of their respective HRMC's. The HRMD's serve the local Navy
units in the areas in which they are located.
4. Evolution and subsequent development of the original
subprograms to their present form as outlined in OPNAVINST
5300. 6B, the U.S. Navy Human Resource Management Support
System.
5. Establishment of training media and general person-
nel requirements to maintain a "pipeline" of qualified officer
and enlisted personnel for assignment to HRMC/D and other
HRMSS billets.
6. Recognition, after nearly five years of development
and operation, that a means is needed to ascertain the impact
of the HRMSS in those commands to which it is applied. In
12

addition, a means is needed to obtain the necessary informa-
tion for future policy decisions and rational direction of
the effort.
B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
It was with item 6 in the last paragraph that this study
was primarily concerned. Based on informal and unofficial
figures supplied by two HRMC's under operational control of
CINCLANTFLT and CINCPACFLT respectively, the HRMSS concepts
and processes have been introduced and applied in approxi-
mately 50% of the operational commands in both fleets.
[Ref. 2]
Reference 3 indicates that the average dollar cost of
providing HRMSS services to a unit during a Human Resource
Availability (HRAV) was $12,484.18 during the period from
July 1975 through March 1976. This cost is based on a simple
quotient obtained by dividing the HRMC expenses for the
period by the total number of units which received services
during the period. This average cost might be considered
high or low depending upon the point of reference used for
comparison - the cost of a restricted material availability
for a small combatant, for example.
Assuming that the average cost cited is considered
significant, the figure does not include other applicable
cost factors. Among these are training for Human Resource
Management Specialists (HRM specialists), HRMC/D man hours
to provide services to a given unit, man hour costs to the
13

unit receiving the services, and salaries for HRMC/D support
(military) personnel. If a dollar cost figure could be
placed on these additional factors, the marginal cost of
providing HRMSS services becomes relatively high.
The high cost raises the question of what organizational
benefit is being received for the expenditure of resources
necessary to provide and receive HRMSS services. Before this
question can be answered, however, the more basic question
concerning how to evaluate the impact of the HRMSS in the
operational units to which it is applied must be addressed.
With respect to the HRMSS, the question of impact
evaluation implies two companion and sequentially related
questions :
1. The thoroughness and quality with which HRMSS
services are provided to a unit by HRM specialists performing
the necessary tasks and activities associated with an HRAV.
2. The degree to which unit performance in one or more
areas of interest (as indicated by generally recognizable and
acceptable performance measures) has been positively or
negatively affected by the unit's involvment in an HRAV. The
purpose of this study was to provide methodology by which
cognizant managers at all levels could obtain answers to these
questions. Ability to assess the HRMSS and its impact
objectively is an assumed necessity for system managers in
order that they be able to effect continual internal improve-
ment of the system through policy and procedure changes. In
14

addition, ability to assess system impact objectively would
aid cognizant managers in efficient allocation of resources.
C. APPROACH
The approach to provide a way to answer the two questions
noted above was essentially to consider each question as an
entity and then to gather the information necessary to answer
each. It was assumed initially that if associated HRAV tasks
and activities were not performed well by HRM specialists
then the goals and objectives of the system could not be met
using this mechanism. The second assumption was that if the
HRAV tasks and activities were performed adequately the
corresponding change in unit performance would be more
dramatic in those units having experienced the HRAV than in
those units which had not had the experience.
To obtain information to answer the question concerning
how well the HRAV tasks and activities were performed, a key
consideration was whether or not one could discriminate on
particular criteria among those units that have done "well"
and those that have not. Lacking specific information on
which to base such a discrimination it was necessary to
devise an information gathering mechanism. It was recognized
that two primary sources of data existed from which the
desired information could be obtained. These were the Human
Resource Management Support Team (HRMST) which provided HRAV
services to a given unit and the commanding officer of the
unit receiving the services.
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It was assumed, without validation at this point, that
a set of questions could be asked of both parties which
would reveal the perceptions of each concerning how well the
activities were performed. On the one hand, the HRMST could
be asked how well they thought they performed in conducting
the various HRAV associated tasks and activities. On the
other, the HRMST perceptions could be checked by asking
essentially the same set of questions of the commanding
officer in whose unit the activities were performed. The idea
behind this approach was that if the HRAV associated tasks
and activities were performed well or even just adequately
then the two sets of answers to the same questions would be
essentially the same. Alternatively, if the two sets of
answers were materially different (as determined by the total
scores for each set of questions or for individual questions
in the set), then the HRMC would have information with which
to begin more detailed investigation of why the answers were
so different and thereby be able to improve the services
provided to operational units.
To obtain information to answer the question of HRAV
impact on unit performance, raw data were acquired in two
generally recognized and accepted performance indicator areas.
These were retention data and scores achieved by several units
for Annual Supply Inspections. The units for which the data
were obtained were all under the administrative control of
the Commander Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet. The
period of observation was from July, 1974 through March, 1976.
16

The retention and inspection score data were obtained
for the same units and for the same time period where
possible. The units for which the data were obtained were
then divided into two groups, those who had participated in
an HRAV (the experiment group) and those who had not
participated in an HRAV (the control group).
The assumption behind this effort was that those units
which had experienced an HRAV would evidence significantly
greater improvement in these areas (by comparison of inspec-
tion scores attained or percentages of eligible personnel
reenlisted for two observations, one before the HRAV and one
subsequent to the HRAV) than those units in the control
group. It was thought that comparison of results in this
fashion would indicate the degree of HRAV impact on unit
performance .
The questions and the approach to their answers as
outlined in the foregoing paragraphs suggested two distinct
and testable hypotheses:
1. Comparison of evaluation questionnaires completed
by an HRMST and by the commanding officer of the unit for
which the HRMST provided HRAV services at the end of the HRAV
period will show no significant difference in total response
scores for the entire set of questions asked of each party.
2. The degree of performance improvement will be
significantly greater, statistically, for the experiment
group than for the control group when comparing performance
17

for both groups over two consecutive observations timed such
that the HRAV's for the experiment group falls between the
observations.
Testing these hypotheses by use of the approach outlined above
was both the purpose and the focus of effort for this study.
D. LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS OF THE STUDY
Lack of available specific information with which the
questions of HRAV quality and unit performance impact could
be answered limited the study to the determination of a
feasible approach with which the questions could be answered.
Though a feasible approach was determined (as will be shown),
it was based on many assumptions derived from the author's
own experience as an HRM specialist assigned to HRMC Norfolk,
VA during the period from November, 1972 through August,
1975. Inasmuch as the assumptions are stated where necessary
in this report, the reader will be able to understand how
the conclusions of the study were arrived at. However, the
assumptions should be viewed with the skepticism that they
reflect the perceptual biases of the author. As such, they
should be verified if more rigorous development of the
approach offered herein is attempted.
Because of time and resource constraints the data samples
used to test the two stated hypotheses were, of necessity,
smaller than those which might normally be required for
rigorous statistical analysis. Since this study was confined
to determining an approach for assessing HRAV quality and
18

impact it was assumed that the sample size used was adequate
to reveal how the approach might be implemented. However,
the conclusions to which the analysis done for this study
lead (based on the small samples used) might also be viewed
with skepticism and should be verified by more rigorous and
independent research.
The data used to test the two hypotheses were, of
necessity, from different sets of units. Questionnaires
designed to ascertain how well HRAV tasks and activities are
done were used on a trial basis by the HRMC's at Norfolk, VA
,
San Diego, CA , and Pearl Harbor, HI and their subordinate
HRMD's between 1 May and 31 July, 1976. The data for the
units to test the second hypothesis covered the earlier
period indicated above. For these units, it was impossible
to determine whether or not the HRAV was done well. Similarly,
for the units selected to test the first hypothesis neither
retention data nor Annual Supply Inspection scores were
available for the period of observation. Because the data
used to test the two hypotheses were from different units
and different time periods direct association between how
well an HRAV is accomplished and its ultimate impact on unit
performance was not attempted in this study. It was thought,
however, that such an association could be made following
accumulation of sufficient appropriate data by use of the




E. A NOTE CONCERNING HRMSS ORGANIZATION
To assist the uninformed reader to understand the HRMSS
more clearly, Figures 1 and 2 below show the HRMSS organiza-
tional relationships and the organization of a typical HRMC















The direct line relationships shown in Figure 1 are self
evident. Of interest is that the HRMC's are "third echelon"
commands under the respective fleet commanders in chief. This
is indicative of the inportance attached to the HRMSS by Navy
1 eaders
.
The respective roles of the Chief of Naval Personnel
and the Chief of Naval Education and Training with respect
to the HRMSS are supportive in nature. The Chief of Naval
Personnel specifies billet requirements and personnel
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qualifications for the several HRMSS job classifications.
In addition, personnel are ordered into HRMSS billets by
the Chief of Naval Personnel. The Chief of Naval Education
and Training provides the initial training required for
personnel order to fill HRMSS billets.
Each HRMC is a command entity. Typically the HRMC is


















The functions of the department level officers below the
Executive Officer level are suggested by their respective
billet titles. The largest number of personnel assigned to
HRMC's serve as HRM specialists organized into several Human
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Resource Management Support Teams (HRMST's). It is the
HRMST which actually provides HRAV services to operational
Navy commands.
F. SUMMARY
The HRMSS development, implementation, and operation is
an ongoing effort of nearly five years duration. It seeks to
assist Navy leaders and managers at all levels to achieve the
best use of their available resources. This is accomplished
by focusing on the Navy's people as individual human
resources .
HRMSS services are provided to operational Navy commands
by specially trained personnel assigned to several strate-
gically located HRMC's and HRMD's under the cognizance of the
major fleet commanders in chief. Subsequent evolution and
development has resulted in the present form of the HRMSS as
described in OPNAVINST 5300. 6B . At present one of the needs
of the system is the establishment of a means to assess HRMSS
ef f ecti veness .
The marginal cost of providing HRMSS services to commands
using the mechanism of the HRAV is relatively high if one
considers alternative uses for available funding. The high
cost raises the question of organizational benefit received
from the expenditure of resources necessary to provide HRMSS
services. This question leads, in turn, to two companion
and sequentially related questions concerning how well asso-
ciated HRAV tasks and activities are performed and impact of
the HRAV on a unit's operational performance.
22

An approach to provide answers to these two questions
is offered. The questions are reformed into two distinct
and testable hypotheses:
1. Comparison of evaluation questionnaires completed
by an HRMST and by the commanding officer of the unit for
which the HRMST provided HRAV services at the end of the
HRAV period will show no significant difference in total
response scores for the entire set of questions asked of
each party.
2. The degree of performance improvement will be
significantly greater, statistically, for the experiment
group than for the control group when comparing performance
for both groups over two consecutive observations timed such
that the HRAV ' s for the experiment group fall between the
observations.
The testing of these hypotheses with the approach
offered by this study was both the purpose and the focus of
effort for the study. Considering certain limitations and
constraints of the study the results obtained should be
viewed skeptically. It is anticipated, however, that more
rigorous development of the approach will yield a way for
system managers to realistically and objectively evaluate the
effectiveness and impact of the HRAV, and having such informa
tion will aid managers to make future policy and resource




A. OVERVIEW - THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE HRMSS
Currently, the elements that comprise the HRMSS are
organized into three major categories:
1. Human Resource Management, including leadership and
management and overseas diplomacy,
2. Equal Opportunity /Race Relations, and
3. Drug Abuse Control and Alcoholism prevention.
These three components are the evolutionary and develop-
mental results of the original five programs alluded to in
the first chapter of this report. Though each of the three
components focuses on a rather narrowly defined subset of
potential socially oriented problem areas, improvement is
sought in all three areas for the same ends of improved
performance and more effective mission accomplishment both
at the unit level and, as a result, throughout the Navy at
1 arge.
The primary mechanism by which HRMSS concepts and
practices are introduced into operational Navy commands is
the Human Resource Availability (HRAV). The HRAV is a period
of time, usually of one week's duration, set aside for a
unit's leaders to examine, in depth, their own leadership and
management practices. The HRAV for a given unit is scheduled
by the fleet commander in chief having operational control of
24

that unit, and it becomes part of the unit's normal employ-
ment schedule. During the HRAV, the unit is supposedly free
of all other operational commitments so that the time can
be spent exclusively in examination of its internal practices
with respect to its human resources and with a view toward
improvement of those practices. Normally each unit is
assigned an HRAV once during each training cycle. The
training cycle is defined roughly as a period of 18 months to
two years.
After a unit is assigned an HRAV, the commanding officer
of the unit is contacted by personnel from the nearest HRMC
or HRMD approximately four to six weeks prior to the scheduled
period. An initial meeting is arranged between the unit
commanding officer and personnel from the HRMC/D. At this
meeting, the HRMSS and its requirements are fully explained
to the commanding officer, and the role of the HRMC/D as a
source of assistance to him is established.
Following initial contact, a schedule is arranged,
usually with the unit's executive officer, for administering
the U.S. Navy Human Resource Management Survey to all
personnel assigned to the unit. Unit personnel are divided
into groupings which correspond as closely as possible to
their normal daily work groups. For example, all Radioman
personnel working in a ship's communications spaces would
be assigned to the same grouping for the purpose of the
survey. Each such grouping is assigned a unique code for
25

later computer output identification. At the appointed
time, the survey is administered - usually onboard the unit
assigned the HRAV.
After the survey is administered, completed answer
documents are returned to the HRMC for computer processing.
Survey administration and processing generally occur approxi-
mately three weeks prior to the scheduled HRAV period.
The processed survey data are returned to the origniating
HRMC/D for analysis by the leading HRM specialist assigned
to provide services to the unit scheduled for the HRAV. By
his analysis, he determines general areas which might be of
concern to the unit's commanding officer (including areas
wherein unit personnel perceive the command to be performing
well). Survey data analysis may be performed by personnel
other than the assigned leading HRM specialist, but his is
generally the responsibility to ensure that the analysis is
done.
The analyzed survey data are returned to the unit's
commanding officer - only. One of the major strengths of
the HRMSS is its recognition that the local commanding
officer is probably the best judge of what occurs within his
command, and that he is probably in the best position to take
whatever action may be necessary. HRMC/D personnel assigned
to provide HRAV services to Navy commands are therefore
constrained, by specific direction in Ref. 4, to maintain
whatever information they receive about a particular command
26

in the strictest of confidence. No reports concerning a
command are made to anyone except the commanding officer of
that command.
Having received the survey data for his command, the
commanding officer is invited and encouraged to interpret
the results with respect to his unique position and knowledge
of what his assigned personnel are really trying to say in
their aggregated responses to the survey questions.
Presumably the survey results highlight general areas of
possible concern which the commanding officer might wish to
investigate further. Feedback of survey results to the
commanding officer generally occurs in the second week prior
to the scheduled HRAV period.
Armed with the survey results and other pertinent
information, the unit commanding officer is now in a better
position to decide how to use the scheduled HRAV period to
best advantage for his command. Approximately one week prior
to the scheduled HRAV period, the assigned HRM specialist
meets with the commanding officer to plan and perform detailed
scheduling for the specific activities to be conducted during
the HRAV. For example, one of the survey results might
indicate that nonrated personnel, as a group, do not think
that senior command personnel listen attentively when
information originates in the subordinate levels. One of the
HRAV activities might then be to provide training for senior
personnel in communications with subordinates.
27

It is emphasized that whatever activities occur during
the HRAV , they are under the complete control of the
commanding officer. HRMC/D personnel are assigned to assist
him in implementing his own program of planned improvement
and not to impose a program of "canned" activities designed
to fill a week's time. Realistically, HRMC/D personnel can
and do offer certain "canned" activities which have been
specifically developed for implementing HRMSS concepts within
a command. For example, there are several workshops available
which deal in specific areas such as racial awareness, drug
and alcohol abuse education, communications, overseas diplo-
macy, planning and problem solving, etc. Some of these
specific activities are required by the governing instructions;
however, no instruction requires that particular activities
be conducted specifically during the scheduled HRAV period.
The scheduled HRAV period is generally used by the
command to begin to effect improvement in those areas identi-
fied by the information acquisition and planning activities
done prior to the scheduled period. For example, one of the
results of the HRAV might be the completion of an action plan
with which the command can address and solve its now
specifically identified areas of potential improvement.
On completion of the HRAV, frequent contact between the
HRMC/D and the command ceases. Presumably the command now
has the capability to continue its program of planned
improvement without benefit of further HRMC/D involvement.
28

If further HRMC/D assistance is required, it can be made
available to the unit commanding officer consistent with his
desires and the availability of HRMC/D assets.
From the foregoing description of the HRAV process, the
basic structure of the HRMSS can be visualized as consisting
of the three components shown in Figure 3 below.
HRMSS BASIC STRUCTURE
Figure 3
As the diagrams shows, each node is related to and is affected
by each of the others. The HRM specialist must have something
to offer, and he must be able to offer it in whatever situa-
tion he finds prevailing within the organization to which he
is assigned. What the HRM specialist does is determined to
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a degree by the existing organizational climate of the
command, and this, in turn affects the HRAV process used in
that command.
The HRM specialist uses the HRAV process to affect the
organizational climate in the command receiving the services
such that ultimate organizational improvement results. The
balance of this chapter examines each of the components in
some detail, and it provides a brief description of the
relationship between the HRMSS and the Navy command structure.
B. ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE
Organizational climate is a term used to describe,
simply, the entire set of essentially social conditions
existing within an organization - in this case, a Navy
command. It is a term which defies definition, though many
researchers have attempted to provide a definition. For
example, in Ref. 5, Bennis states, "I mean by 'climate' a set
of values or attitudes which affect the way people relate to
each other such as 'openness', authority patterns, social
relationships, etc." Reference 6 indicates other researchers'
attempts to define organizational climate. Argyris equates
organizational climate with organizational culture, the set
of beliefs, values, and norms that constitute blueprints for
behavior. Halpin and Croft use the metaphor of personality
in their study of the organizational climate of schools.
Halpiji's definition of organizational climate is based on
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Evan offers the definition that, "Organizational Climate is
a multidimensional perception of the essential attributes or
character of an organizational system."
Finally, in Ref. 7, Bowers cites Likert's concept of
organizational climate:
"There is in the concept of the organization
the notion of a flow of events, from causal
conditions through intervening processes to end
results. An adequate understanding of the organiza-
tions' s systemic nature requires that we understand
this flow for any separate group and for all groups
as they exist in a constellation making up the whole.
If groups in an organization were not interconnected,
we could simply sum up their separate properties and
have an understanding of the whole. In fact, however,
end results from some groups form causal inputs for
other groups; thus the flow of events is from group
to group, as well as within any one.
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For the single group, two basic types of causal
characteristics are given preeminent status in
Likert's thinking: managerial behavior and those
organizational conditions which reflect the basic
structure of expectations, roles, policies, and
practices of the organization as they relate to a
particular group. These conditions are described in
terms of the extent to which there is a structure of
groups with overlapping membership, the extent to
which information flows easily and accurately in all
directions, the degree to which there is coordina-
tion among separate operations and units, the degree
to which there is a participative decision-making
structure, and the extent to which motivational
forces generated within the system are positive and
mutually reinforcing, as opposed to negative and
conf 1 i cti ng
.
More recently the term 'organizational climate 1
has been applied to this array of conditions which
affect the basic life of the group and which flow
to the group's milieu from the output of other
groups, particularly those above it in the hierarchy."
Implicit in all these 'definition is the idea of the
feeling one gets when participating in or observing an
organization. The word "feeling" poses yet another defini-
tional problem since what one feels is largely the result of
his application of his own prior experiences and conclusions
to the current situation in which he finds himself.
Similarly, there is the definitional distinction between
"thinking" and "feeling" to be reckoned with. That is, is
thought based on feeling, or is the reverse true? Though
answers to such questions have been proposed, there does not
appear to be much agreement about one answer which is
applicable in all situations. Similarly, there does not seem




With the respect to Navy commands, each can be viewed
as an organizational entity, and each, therefore, has its
own organizational climate. The passages from Halpin's and
Likert's work cited above come closest to the author's
experience as an HRM specialist. One could work in ships of
the same class and at the same location which were alike in
every major respect except for their assigned personnel, and
one would find different situations in each case. The same
was true for aviation squadrons within the same administrative
organization such as an aviation wing, and at the same
location.
At a somewhat lower level, and also within the author's
experience as Engineering Officer in one ship, this same
phenomenon was observable. Of two identical sets of boiler
room and engine room combinations, one seemed always to perform
magnificently; whereas, the other always seemed to be plagued
by unforeseen problems. Again, the only thing different about
these two sets of engine spaces was the assigned personnel.
As a third example, in the same ship the author observed
that two heads of department did not get along particularly
well with one another. Though their arguments were never
conducted in the presence of enlisted crew members, one could
readily see a distinct lack of cooperation among lower level





From these experiences, and extrapolating from the
representative definitions cited above, it is hypothesized
(without proof) that organizational climate is a function of
the attitudes and personalities of the personnel assigned to
a particular unit. It is further hypothesized (without
proof) that senior personnel can then more readily determine
what the climate of the organization of which they are a part
will be by virtue of their positional authority and their
corresponding ability to influence those who occupy lower
hierarchial positions.
Though organizational climate cannot be specifically
defined, its effects can be observed in the way a command or
its subdivisions performs its mission and tasks respectively.
Furthermore, its effect can be determined in the way personnel
talk during an interview or answer certain questions in a
written survey.
It is this rather nebulous factor which the HRM
specialist attempts to affect by using the HRAV process. His
assessment of the initial organizational climate in the
command to which he is assigned is one of the main factors
in the success or failure of HRMSS application to a Navy
command .
C. THE HRAV PROCESS
The generalized steps of the HRAV process, by which
HRMSS concepts are introduced into an operational Navy unit,
were outlined in section A of this chapter, and they need
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not be repeated here. Suffice to say that each of the steps
is important to the success of the entire effort, and they
must be accomplished sequentially in a building process of
which the scheduled HRAV period is the final result.
In one respect, the initial contact between the HRMC/D
and the commanding officer of the unit scheduled for an HRAV
is perhaps the most important part of the sequence. As
indicated above, the entire concept of the HRMSS is based on
assistance to a commanding officer; that is, HRMC/D personnel
come onboard his command to help him. Generally, the initial
contact is made by one of three personnel from the HRMC/D -
the commanding officer or officer in charge of the HRMC or
HRMD respectively, the team leader of the Human Resource
Management Support Team (HRMST) assigned to provide service
to the command scheduled for the HRAV, and the leading HRM
specialist who will have primary responsibility for conducting
the HRAV for that command.
At this meeting, which occurs approximately four to six
weeks prior to the scheduled HRAV period, the concepts and
requirements of the HRMSS are explained to the unit commanding
officer. In addition, he is apprised of the specific services
which the HRMC/D is prepared to provide. Sometimes, the HRM
specialist's gathering of pertinent information concerning
the unit's organizational climate is begun at this point by
asking leading questions of the commanding officer such as,
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"What do you think about the command, in general?", or, "If
you could change anything in the command, what would you
change?"
Most importantly, it is at this first "face-to-face"
meeting that the beginning of rapport between the HRMC/D and
the command scheduled for the HRAV is established. Every
attempt is made to assure the commanding officer that the
HRMC/D role is that of assistance only - assistance as
opposed to inspection. Similarly, every effort is made to
persuade him that any improvement program that results will
be generated within the command by command personnel, and it
will be under the complete control of the commanding officer.
The commanding officer's behavior and displayed attitude
during the initial meeting can range from complete skepticism
to genuine enthusiasm. For him, it is completely a "free
play" situation. If he evidences enthusiasm, subsequent
activities will generally be easier for the KRM specialist
to perform. If skeptical, the challenge is to the HRM
special ist(s) to enable him to see the possible benefit to
his command of participation in the HRAV and its associated
activities. Here, it must be remembered that there is no
formal requirement for the command to do anything at all
during the scheduled HRAV period.
Assuming that the initial contact is successfully
accomplished, as evidenced by the commanding officer's
willingness to proceed even though he may not yet fully
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understand the HRMSS, its concepts, or its possible
implications for his command, the next several steps of the
process are primarily concerned with administration of tjje
Human Resource Management Survey to personnel in the command.
Like the initial contact, this phase of the process is
important in its own right as well as its being necessary to
the success of the entire effort.
The survey is a document of two separate and distinct
forms. One is used to assess the perceptions of operational
units afloat and ashore and is geared primarily to military
personnel. The other is used to assess the perceptions of
shore based support facility personnel and is geared primarily
to civilian personnel. The two documents contain different
numbers of questions, and some of the questions contained in
the two forms are of slightly different types. However, the
purpose of both documents is essentially the same, each
seeking to assess aggregate perception of the organization by
its assigned personnel. The following discussion relates to
the form used in operational units, but they apply as well to
the other form. Where the two forms differ, the differences
are not conceptual. They are, rather,, in the numbers and
types of questions asked only.
The HRM Survey is a document consisting of a core of 88
questions of the form, "To was extent is this command
interested in the welfare and morale of assigned personnel?"
Respondents answer each question by choosing one from among
the five possible answers indicated below.
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1. To a Very Little Extent
2. To a Little Extent
3. To Some Extent
4. To a Great Extent
5. To a Very Great Extent
In addition to the 88 core questions, the option is
available to the commanding officer to add up to 30 additional
questions of his own and to tailor them specifically to his
command. The additional questions, if used, are written in
the same format as the core questions, and their results are
included in the computer print of survey results. The core
questions constitute an adaptation of Likert's "Survey of
Organizations" [Ref. 8] tailored to U.S. Navy application.
The arrangements for administration of the survey are
usually made by the command's Executive Officer and the
leading HRM specialist assigned to the command. The crew is
divided into coded groupings that correspond as closely as
possible to the normal work groups to which the command's
personnel are assigned. Through this coding and the computer
program with which the survey is processed, areas which might
be of interest to the commanding officer can be localized to
the group or groups who express concern in those areas by
their aggregated answers to survey questions. Similarly, the
crew is divided into other demographic groupings such as age,
educational background, time in the command, time in the Navy,
paygrade, marital status, racial and ethnic background, etc.
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This is done for the same purpose of being able to localize
possible areas of concern to those groups who express the
concern. By such groupings, the unit's commanding officer
is afforded a wide choice of data that he can obtain by
judicious choice of computer prints based on these groupings
or combinations of these groupings. This capability ensures
that the data he receives will be specifically oriented to
his command and will be of a quantity necessary to provide
only meaningful or potentially useful information.
After these arrangements are completed, the survey is
administered to as many of the command's assigned personnel
as possible consistent with time and other resource constraints
such as space requirements and availability of personnel on
leave or otherwise engaged. The purpose of what they are
doing is explained to them either by senior personnel in the
command (i.e., commanding officer, executive officer, or
other designated representative of the commanding officer)
or by the HRM specialist administering the survey. Here,
again, an opportunity exists for the HRM specialist to gather
some information about the existent organizational climate.
If senior command personnel administer the survey, what
remarks do they make specifically, and how are they delivered
(for example, are the remarks made enthusiastically or with
sarcasm)? Alternatively, if the HRM specialist does the
explanation (with prior permission of the commanding officer),
has he been restricted with respect to what he may explain
39

concerning the purpose of the survey? Another indication of
the existing organizational climate are the questions and/or
the "aside" comments generated by crew members throughout the
survey administration process.
One important aspect of administration of the survey is
that the answers made to survey questions by individual
respondents are held in the strictest of confidence. Nowhere
is the respondent asked to indicate his name or other
identifying information such as his Social Security Account
Number. Also, a protective feature exists in the computer
processing program that deletes the printing of responses for
any subgroup in which there are less than three respondents.
This groups answers would be aggregated elsewhere with those
of larger groupings (such as the entire command group), but
they would not be shown as an identifiable group by themselves
This feature applies to the groupings that correspond to the
normal work groups as well as to other demographic groupings
for which information might be desired. This "confiden-
tiality" of individual responses is a design feature of the
HRMSS used to elicit honesty in the answers provided by
individuals in completing the survey. The assumption behind
the need for honesty in the responses is that if the survey
answers are not honest, they can cause the results of the
survey to be erroneous, and any subsequent action taken might
be misplaced; thus wasting the time and effort of all
concerned at best, or causing longer term deleterious effects
within the command at worst.
40

Once the survey administration is completed, the answer
forms are returned to the HRMC/D for processing by comDuter.
This results in a printed document which shows the aggregated
responses for all the survey questions (individually) averaged
for all personnel in the command who answered the questions.
Similarly, the aggregated answers are provided automatically
by paygrade and raci al /ethni c groupings. Other printouts are
also available for other demographic groupings or combinations
of groupings as desired by the commanding officer.
In the printout, the 88 core questions are arranged in
twelve dimensions, some of which are further divided into
more specific indexes. These are as follows:




d. Human Resource Emphasis













4. Work Group Processes
a. Work Group Coordination
b. Work Group Readiness
c. Work Group Discipline
5. Satisfaction









If one refers to the representative definitions provided
for organizational climate in section B of this chapter, it
will be apparent that all of the headings for survey question
groupings except the last four are concerned with some
observable aspect of organizational climate. Right, wrong,
or indifferent (assuming honesty in the responses) the
responses show, on the average, how various aspects of the
command are perceived by the personnel in that command at
the time that they completed the survey. For example, the
survey might indicate a rather negative perception among
non-rated personnel as a group that the command is interested
in the welfare and morale of its assigned personnel. Whether
or not the negative perception is correct, that is how the
non-rated personnel saw it at the time they completed the
survey. Alternatively, the same question asked of Chief
Petty Officers or officer level personnel might elicit a
more positive group response. This might indicate their
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relative closeness to where decisions are made in the
command, their access to greater amounts of information than
is normally available to non-rated personnel, or it could
indicate that these levels, being more or less responsible
for day to day welfare and morale, think they are doing an
adequate job in this area.
The example cited in the last paragraph is indicative
of the type of analysis done with the survey printout by the
assigned HRM specialist. Given his training, his overall
Navy experience, his knowledge of the HRMSS and its concepts,
and his knowledge of the survey, the analysis he performs
will provide information to him concerning possible areas of
concern to the commanding officer of the unit to whose
personnel the survey was administered. The HRM specialist
highlights his findings and then prepares to feed back the
information he has gleaned to the unit commanding officer.
In some cases, while the HRM specialist is conducting his
analysis, an extra copy of the printout document is provided
to the commanding officer prior to any information being fed
back to him by the HRM specialist. This gives the commanding
officer an opportunity to review the data independent of HRM
specialist input and to draw his own conclusions based on
what he knows about his unit. If he is reasonably well
prepared beforehand with format and rationale information for
the data contained in the survey printout document, his own
analysis might be more effective than analysis done by the
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HRM specialist. In any event he can at least become familiar
with the data while it is being analyzed.
At some mutually agreeable time the HRM specialist
presents a report of his findings as well as any outstanding
copies of the survey results to the commanding officer. From
the author's experience, this meeting is the second critical
point in the process. Again, this is a "free play" situation
for the commanding officer. He may agree or disagree with
the analysis done by the HRM specialist. He may be surprised
and/or displeased at the answers given to some of the ques-
tions by the crew or groups thereof: On the other hand, the
survey results might only verify what he has already known
implicitly, and this too may occasion his pleasure or
di spl easure.
Assuming honesty of purpose on the part of the HRM
specialist, he must be extremely careful in his dealings with
the commanding officer at this meeting. The HRM specialist
is generally significantly junior in rank to the commanding
officer with whom he is dealing. The HRM specialist may or
may not have had prior command experience of his own. If he
has not, and if the commanding officer is skeptical of the
analysis results, it is possible for the HRM specialist to
expect an attack on his credibility of the form, "What
experience have you had which leads you to this particular
conclusion?" In such a situation, the HRM specialist is
completely on his own, and he must be able to parry such.
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attacks, maintain his credibility, and maintain an amicable
relationship with the commanding officer. At the other
extreme, the analysis might have indicated a generally
positive reaction among command personnel to some survey
question. In this case, the commanding officer might not
evidence too much interest if he is focusing only on the
"problem" areas. Here, too, the HRM specialist must exercise
care and encourage the commanding officer to examine why the
response is positive. Such an analysis might provide the
basis for improvement actions in other areas.
In the author's experience, the feedback of survey
results to the commanding officer was usually the point in
the sequence where that individual really began to think
seriously about the HRMSS, its concepts, and its implications
for him and his command. If the feedback of information was
successful, cooperation and greater enthusiasm for partici-
pating in subsequent activities was usually assured. If not,
participation by the command in the HRAV was largely mechanical
with little interest among the participants in the proceedings.
The next step after feedback of the survey information
is the planning of specific activities to be conducted during
the scheduled HRAV period. As with feedback of survey
information, the role of the HRM specialist as an assistant
to the commanding officer is crucial. At this point it would
be reasonable to expect the commanding officer to realize
that whatever activities are performed are at his behest. It
would also be reasonable to expect him to be able to specify
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those activities which should be conducted to effect improve-
ment in areas of concern to him.
In the author's experience, these expectations were
seldom realized. A commanding officer is an extremely busy
person who must organize his concerns in some sort of priority
of their importance to the command. The HRAV simply might
not have the highest priority. Another possible reason is
that he is somewhat overwhelmed by the amount of survey
information he has received and has not had adequate time to
digest all of it before he is expected to decide on specific
activities aimed at improvement. A third possibility is that
he may not know what to do to improve a particular aspect of
his command, even though he desires to see improvement.
In any event, if the commanding officer is unable or
unwilling to specify how the time available during the
scheduled HRAV is to be spent, it is incumbent upon the HRM
specialist, in his role of assistant to the commanding
officer, to be prepared to offer a planned program of
activities. In doing so, the HRM specialist must account for
the requirements of the HRMSS as well as the perceived needs
of the commanding officer for whom he is providing the
service. Additionally, it is his responsibility to transfer
such skills to members of the crew as are necessary for the
command to continue its program of planned improvement
independent of HRMC/D involvement. Finally, and realistically,
the HRM specialist must be aware that though the scheduled
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HRAV period is designed so that the command is free of other
operational commitments no such restriction is placed on the
periods immediately prior to or subsequent to the HRAV period
In the author's experience, more often than not the unit
scheduled for the HRAV was also scheduled for other major
evolutions in the periods just before or just after the HRAV,
and these evolutions required their own just portions of time
from command personnel in preparation.
By whatever method is used for the planning, it is
accomplished, and the final step of the HRAV process is the
conduct of the planned activities during the scheduled HRAV
period. Such activities are generally of three forms:
1. The gathering of specific amplifying information
about areas of concern generated by the survey through
interview or observation of individuals or small groups.
2. Training activities in the form of seminars or
workshops for designated groups of command personnel.
3. Specialized consultive service to particular
individuals and groups with specific functions such as the
Human Relations Council, Equal Opportunity Program Specialist
(if assigned), and other personnel connected with HRMSS
related activities or functions within the command.
Of the training activities, there are the "canned"
programs already mentioned, or specific training activities
may be designed by the HRM specialist or by command personnel
to fit a particular situation. The leading HRM specialist
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usually has at his disposal several other HRM specialists
with particular training and expertise in the various sub-
programs of the HRMSS. As a group, these personnel constitute
a Human Resource Management Support Team (HRMST). The team's
responsibility is to help implement the commanding officer's
program of improvement by transferring, through training,
necessary skills to command personnel such that the improve-
ment program will be sustained after the HRAV is completed.
In conducting these activities, the HRM specialists must
exercise care that they say or do nothing which undermines
the commanding officer's authority or prerogatives. They
must say or do nothing without his knowledge and/or consent.
When unanticipated anomalies occur during the HRAV activities,
it is incumbent upon the HRM specialists to keep the
commanding officer informed. In short, the HRM specialists
must not knowingly, under any circumstances, create expecta-
tions among subordinate personnel that conditions in the
command are going to change at all. This prerogative belongs
to the commanding officer alone and not to the HRM specialist,
the HRMC/D, nor the HRMSS. Realistically, it happens
occasionally that the yery presence of HRMC/D personnel in
a command creates expectations among crew members that things
are going to change, even though the specialists themselves
do nothing to foster this impression. If such is the case, it
is incumbent upon the HRM specialists to recognize what is
happening and take appropriate steps to rectify the situation,
always keeping the commanding officer informed.
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The final contact between the HRMC/D and the command
scheduled for the HRAV is usually a meeting between the
leading HRM specialist and the commanding officer. This
meeting is generally concerned with the HRM specialist
summarizing what has occurred and what results can be
expected. Also, the commanding officer is usually offered
the availability of follow- on assistance as desired and as
consistent with the availability of HRMC/D assets.
The HRAV process, briefly described here, will vary in
detail with application to each command in which it occurs,
but the sequence is generally the same for all applications.
The variation in detail is dependent on the organizational
climate that exists in the command and on the individual
style of operating used by the HRM special ist(s) providing
the service. The description belies the complexity of the
actual operation. The HRM specialist deals with people as
individuals and in groups. He must be able to correctly
interpret each situation as he finds it and have the ability
to respond appropriately such that the command in which he
is working derives the greatest benefit. If, through
misinterpretation or misguided action he makes a mistake or
a faulty judgement, the recovery of lost credibility is
difficult at best, and it may be impossible to recover at all
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D. THE HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST
As was the case with Organizational Climate, the term
"HRM specialist" defies definition that is generally appli-
cable in every situation. However, as in the case for
Organizational Climate, external characteristics of personnel
assigned to duties in HRM specialist billets can be observed.
In an article appearing in the periodic "Officer Personnel
Newsletter" promulgated by the Bureau of Naval Personnel in
the Spring, 1976 issue [Ref. 9] several criteria for selection
of officer personnel to duty assignments as HRM specialists
were listed.
"This (selection)* criteria is applicable to
lieutenants and above, and CW02 through CW04.
Ensigns are not eligible for the program. LTJG's,
either unrestricted line or LDO, who have exhibited
high quality performance and who are in the next
promotion zone may be assigned."
Significant in this statement is the restriction of selection
for HRM specialist duties to relatively senior and experienced
personnel. The article then goes on to provide more specific
criteria for selection of personnel in each grade from
Lieutenant through Commander. At each level the words,
"be a high quality performer" or some variation of these
words appears. Also at the LCDR and CDR levels, the require-
ment exists that the selectees have had a prior tour of duty
in command or have passed selection for command duty. For




specialist assignment are comparable. Similar requirements
for selection of enlisted personnel to HRM specialist
assignment also exist. They must be in paygrade E5 or above,
and they must have demonstrated outstanding performance in
their previous work in their ratings. It is seen, therefore,
that only high quality and experienced Navy personnel are
considered for duty as HRM specialists.
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Though the foregoing excerpts and comments generally
describe how personnel are selected and trained for duty as
HRM specialists, they say nothing about the individual
characteristics of the personnel so selected and so trained
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E. HRMSS INTERFACE WITH THE NAVY COMMAND SYSTEM
With respect to Figure 3, the preceding three sections
of this chapter have attempted to describe the three major
components of the HRMSS basic structure - organizational
climate, the HRAV process, and the HRM specialist. All three
components must interact, and each is affected by the others.
All must work in concert if the objectives of the HRMSS are
to be realized. The description provided, however, applies
to the micro-level; that is, it applies to the individual
command. The HRMSS is designed for application throughout
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the entire Navy, and it is designed to be of benefit to the
entire Navy. How then is all the effort applied in individual
units tied together such that the Navy as a whole can be
shown as receiving benefit?
Reference 4 again provides guidance in answering this
question.
"Accountability for command performance in
support of HRM will occur in three ways:
1. Commanders and commanding officers will
periodically review, assess, and revise their
Command Action Plan (CAP) and their Equal Oppor-
tunity Affirmative Action Plan (AAP) as directed...
This internal command assessment insures that
unit action meets the needs and priorities of
the unit while supporting improved Human Resource
Management ;
2. Immediate superiors in command will
assess subordinate performance in support of the
Navy HRM system as part of their normal command
inspection and evaluation functions;
3. The Navy Inspector General will
periodically conduct formal evaluations in
accordance with ... Enclosure (6) (to Ref. 4)*
provides those commands whose type commanders
and/or immediate superiors in command (ISIC)
have not promulgated assessment procedures with
an HRM System self-assessment guide, and provides
the basis for development of formal evaluation
criteria. "
Elsewhere in the instruction, specific responsibilities
are outlined for major second and third echelon commanders
in order to exercise control over the application of the




provides overall policy coordination, planning, development,
and monitoring of the entire HRMSS. The Chief of Naval
Education and Training (CNET) is directed to sponsor,
coordinate training policy, and provide planning guidance
for HRM training support. Fleet commanders in chief are
responsible for implementing, supporting, and maintaining the
HRM program elements in all commands under their cognizance.
Similar responsibilities are detailed for other appropriate
senior management personnel.
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Though, the foregoing description is brief, one gets the
impression of an entire and complete management system.
Assuming that each command at the base of the system meets the
minimum requirements and that the specific responsibilities
of upper echelon leaders are discharged, then, ideally, the
entire Navy should derive benefit from the HRMSS and be
improved thereby. Unfortunately, in the author's opinion,
the guidance of Ref. 4 is no specific enough to determine
just what benefit is to be received. Also unfortunately, any
amplifying instructions that have been promulgated by subor-
dinate echelons and which detail the benefit to be received
and how it is to be measured were not available to the author.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter has been included to provide background
information for what follows to the uninformed reader
concerning the basic structure of the HRMSS. The descriptions
provided are based solely on the author's experience as an
HRM specialist and various official documents or other
published literature.
The HRMSS is essentially comprised of three major
components which are organizational climate, the HRAV process,
and the HRM specialist. Each component must interact with
the others, and each is affected by the others. The entire
system is tied together in a hierarchical management structure
with specific responsibilities detailed for each level.
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Presumably, the Navy at large realizes some benefit
from the application of the HRMSS. However, just what the
benefit is and how it is measured (or how it should be
measured) are unclear. The next several chapters describe
the author's attempt to provide a way to assess the impact
of the HRAV in the units that participate.
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III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
A. OVERVIEW - HRMSS EVALUATION REQUIREMENTS
As indicated in the Introduction, the marginal cost of
providing HRMSS services to one command via the HRAV process
is relatively high in terms of dollar value when one considers
alternative uses for funding. By way of comparison, however,
the total annual cost of operating the entire HRMSS is
relatively insignificant with respect to the total annual
personnel -rel ated costs of the Department of the Navy.
[Ref. 11] For example, if the $12,000.00 unit cost figure
(without consideration of additional related man hour costs)
cited in the Introduction is assumed to be reasonably accurate,
and if a typical HRMC is assumed to be capable of providing
HRAV's for 120 units annually, then the total annual cost of
operating an HRMC is approximately $1,500,000.00. Given that
there are five HRMC's in the system, the total annual opera-
ting costs for providing HRM services to operational units
equal approximately $7,500,000.00.
References 3 and 12 indicate that the current annual
HRMC operating costs are approximately $2,000,000.00 each,
that total annual HRMC operating costs are approximately
$10,000,000.00, and that the HRMC is capable of providing





The fiscal 1977 defense budget of approximately 112
billion dollars depicts the Navy's portion as roughly one
third of the total or $38,685,000,000.00. Of this amount,
approximately $12,000,000,000.00 are direct or indirect
personnel costs. Comparing the total annual operating costs
of the HRMC's to the total annual Navy personnel costs, one
sees that the annual operating cost of the HRMC's is only
roughly 1/1000 of the total personnel costs.
This seems a small price to pay in order to meet the
objectives of the HRMSS. Furthermore, it seems to be a
worthwhile expenditure if the HRMSS objectives are being
met. Even though annual operating costs for the HRMC's are
small, they do constitute monies which could be applied to
other uses such as operation and maintenance. The crucial
question then is that of whether or not the HRMSS objectives
are being met, such that even so small an expenditure is
justified. The following example illustrates the magnitude
of the problem one encounters in attempting to answer this
question.
Paragraph five of 0PNAVINST 53000. 6B [Ref. 4] lists the
eleven objectives of the HRMSS. The first objective
appearing in the list is, "Improved unit readiness and
operational capability." Taken as given without analysis,
this objective is at least recognizable as worthy of the
efforts of all Navy men and women. Examined in more detail,
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however, exactly what constitutes improved unit readiness
and operational capability is unclear. Improved unit
readiness suggests some existing level of readiness which is
considered somehow inadequate by some standard. Alterna-
tively, it may mean improvement of the level of readiness
currently extant in Navy units to some higher level. A third
interpretation is that there is some range of measure for
unit readiness which is bound by some defined minimum level
above which all units' levels of readiness should be raised.
The questions raised by the term "improved unit
readiness" can also be asked in a definitional sense. For
example, "Readiness for what?" The obvious answer is,
"Readiness for mission accomplishment." However, what of
those units with multiple mission requirements? Which
mission has priority? How much of the unit's effort should
be spent fulfilling its primary mission, and how much effort
should be spent fulfilling secondary or tertiary missions?
Similarly, the word "improvement" raises a corresponding
set of questions. Improvement in what specific areas? How
much improvement is required? How is improvement to be
measured?
Such are some of the questions raised by the term
"improved unit readiness." The other half of this particular
objective, "improved operational capability," also raises
similar questions. It should be remembered that this is but
one of eleven objectives identified for the HRMSS.
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In the author's experience as an HRM specialist working
with Navy units, most of the commanding officers encountered
evidenced rather thorough knowledge of the HRMSS concepts
and objectives as outlined in OPNAVINST 5300. 6B. However,
in most cases these individuals also wanted to know what they
had to do specifically to implement their programs of planned
improvement. Just as often, the HRM specialist was placed
in a position where there was no ready answer to such a
question. He was thus forced to fall-back position where he
would have to ask the commanding officer some variation of
the question, "What do you want to do?" If the commanding
officer could not answer this question, the HRM specialist
could, and often did, offer several alternatives generally
confined to the framework of the HRAV process. These
alternatives were generally concerned with the gathering of
information more specific than the survey could produce or
conducting various workshops and training sessions. If the
commanding officer agreed to what was offered, the activities
were duly conducted.
Unfortunately, having no specifically defined and
measureable criteria to guide him, the HRM specialist was
at a loss to ascertain what specific results were to be
achieved, from a practical point of view, by the unit's
participation in the activities. Therefore, though the
activities could be conducted mechanically well by virtue of
the HRM specialist's knowledge and experience, the results
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were more often than not in doubt. The HRM specialist could
report to the commanding officer that certain activities had
taken place. He could also provide his observations of any
results achieved, such observations being based solely on
the biases of the individual HRM specialist doing the
reporting. He could also speculate that given the particular
training imparted to the crew and continued command support
some improvement would probably be realized at some time in
the future. He was not, however, able to specify just what
improvement would be manifested or how much time would be
required. Finally, notwithstanding that OPNAVINST 5300. 6B
indicates that all units shall receive follow-on assistance
as desired by the commanding officer and consistent with the
availability of HRMC/D assets, in the author's experience
there were very few such requests.
An example will serve to illustrate. In one unit to
which the author was assigned, the HRAV process was performed,
and some progress was evident among crew personnel, having
been made aware of the HRMSS concepts, attempting to improve
certain aspects of the command. Immediately following the
scheduled HRAV period, the commanding officer was relieved
as a result of regular rotation. Prior to his being relieved
he indicated that he would pass on a description of what had
occurred to the new commanding officer so that the hard-won
improvement momentum could be maintained.
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Following the change of command, the new commanding
officer was contacted and offered assistance. He declined
and indicated that his knowledge was sufficient to continue
the process of improvement begun by his predecessor. No
further follow-on assistance was ever requested by the new
commanding officer.
In due course, this same unit was scheduled for a
second HRAV while this individual was still in command, and,
again, the author was assigned to provide the services. The
resurvey of the crew indicated that general conditions had
reverted back to what was indicated in the original survey
completed by unit personnel nearly one and one half years
earlier. Such progress as was made during the initial HRAV
was not longer evident. It should be borne in mind that
throughout this entire period the unit apparently performed
well enough to accomplish its mission.
Having been the first such case of its kind at the HRMC
where the author was stationed, the situation was analyzed
carefully. The analysis resulted in several possible reasons
for the anomaly.
1. The original HRAV may not have been done as well as
it could have been.
2. Through normal personnel turnover, the personnel
who participated in the initial HRAV were no longer in
residence, and their training was lost.
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3. The new commanding officer did not consider himself
bound by what his predecessor had begun, and, therefore, he
did not support the maintenance of the new knowledge and
skills in those members of the crew who had acquired them.
4. The scheduling of the initial HRAV nearly coincident
with normal rotation of the commanding officer detracted from
the continuity necessary for progress maintenance.
5. The lack of specific definition of what the HRMSS
objectives are led to a loss of momentum because the command,
having begun to make progress, reached a point from which it
did not know how to proceed further.
It was supposed that the anomaly found its source in all
of these reasons to some degree, but, having gone this far
in determining possible causes, the necessary work for
verification was not done, and the opportunity thus presented
to the HRMC for assessment of HRAV impact was lost. If it is
assumed that the HRAV process can be applied in any command
and that the HRM specialist provides the best performance of
which he is capable, the inescapable indications are that the
HRAV was either not done well by the HRM specialist or that
it has no impact in the unit to which it is applied through
non-cooperation of the command or poor desiqn of the HRAV.
The foregoing example also indicates two additional
insights:
1. Without definitive and measureable criteria with
which to mini tor unit performance Cwith respect to HRAV
mechanics and impact) over time, any assessment of HRAV
impact is speculative at best.
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2. Unit performance, as indicated by its capability to
meet its employment schedule or by other general criteria
continues with or without the introduction of the HRAV.
Assuming these indications to have some veracity, the question
of HRAV impact assumes an even greater degree of importance.
Now the question becomes, "Is the time, money, and effort put
into the HRAV worth the expenditure of these resources?"
Having only speculation as a source of information, the
answer to such a question is of limited value at best.
B. ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE HRAV IS ACCOMPLISHED
Assessment of the impact of the HRAV in the units to
which it is applied seems to hinge on the two questions:
1. How well are the various HRAV and related activities
done within the unit?
2. What is the impact of the HRAV in the units to
which it is applied?
This section deals with the first of these questions, and the
second question is addressed in the next section of this
chapter.
Examination of how well the HRAV and related activities
are performed cannot be done without also considering the
HRM specialist who performs the activities and the setting in
which they are performed. The HRAV activities are performed
by the HRM specialists in whatever organizational climate
exists in the participating command. Assuming that whatever
activities are done with respect to the HRAV process have
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been designed to fit a particular situation, the key question
becomes, "Was the situation affected?"
Lacking standard specifically defined objectives for the
HRMSS and lacking standard, specific, and measureable evalua-
tion criteria which, can be applied by an objective third
party, the only sources of information available to determine
how well the HRAV and related activities are done are the
HRMC/D which provides the services and the commanding officer
of the unit that receives the services. If these two sources
are seriously used to assess how well the HRAV and related
activities are done much useful information can be obtained
at relatively insignificant cost.
As mentioned, most of the HRMC/D personnel input is
acquired via one or more of the HRM specialist formal training
courses. Upon arrival at the HRMC/D to which assigned, the
HRM specialist receives further training by participating in
in-house instruction and on-the-job activities with more
experienced personnel.
Within the HRMC/D, HRM specialists are organized into
Human Resource Management Support Teams (HRMST). Each team
is comprised of several officer and enlisted personnel, each
of whom has received formal training in one or more of the
several components of the HRMSS. Each team is headed by a
middle grade officer (at the LCDR or CDR level) who has had
prior command experience. Each fiscal quarter, the several
units scheduled for an HRAV are divided among the teams
(both at the HRMC and its subordinate detachments), and the
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teams are responsible for providing the necessary services
to their respective assigned units. The HRMST team leader
then allocates his resources to meet his quarterly schedule.
A leading HRM specialist is assigned for each unit, and it
is his responsibility to perform the necessary planning,
coordination, and execution of the HRAV activities for the
unit(s) to which he is assigned. All the other team members
are available to the leading HRM specialist as resources
from which he can draw.
Presumably, the leading HRM specialist, with his or her
training and experience, knows generally what has to be done
in the unit scheduled for the HRAV. He knows the sequence
that must be followed and how much time and personnel each
activity requires generally. If at all possible, the leading
HRM specialists are assigned to units in which they have had
some prior operational experience. For example, a pilot
might be assigned to provide HRAV services to an aircraft
squadron, whereas, a surface warfare officer might be assigned
to provide services for surface units only. Having had prior
operational experience in the unit types to which he is
assigned can be a definite aid to the HRM specialist.
1. It can aid his establishment of credibility with
the commanding officer of the unit to which he is assigned,
and the existence of such credibility is probably a strong
influencing factor in the perceived performance of the HRMST
from the unit commanding officer's Doint of view.
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2. It is helpful in his capability to empathize with
the unit personnel with whom he comes into contact in that he
can understand their problems when they are presented to him
because he has experienced those same problems.
3. It can save him time in assessing the organizational
climate of the unit.
Unfortunately, such prior experience might also work to
the detriment of the HRM apecialist.
1. It may cause him to have preconceived ideas of what
he will perceive in a unit which might be erroneous. If, as
happens occasionally, the HRM specialist is senior in rank
to the unit commanding officer, such erroneous ideas can be
a definite threat to the commanding officer. If the possi-
bility of a basic personality conflict between the two
individuals is considered, the problem is compounded.
2. It may lead him to erroneous conclusions and errors
of judgement. If these, in turn, lead to misdirected action,
the HRM specialist will probably lose credibility at best.
At worst, the unit in which the action takes place will
probably suffer damage from which it miqht be difficult to
recover in terms of the possibly detrimental effects on
organizational climate.
The HRM specialist must know his job [the work content)
and the setting (the work context) in which he performs it.
As suggested by the sequence of events in the HRAV process,
it seems reasonable that certain questions can be asked of
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the HRM specialist which cover each step of the process to
examine how well he thinks the activities were performed.
Using such a procedure with a number of HRM specialists over
a period of time, the HRMC/D could begin to obtain information
with which it could justify operational and/or procedural
changes to improve the services provided. This presupposes
that each HRM specialist provides essentially the same
services in the same sequence and that the HRMC/D provides
its specialists with definitive policy and direction
concerning what they are expected to accomplish in the units
to which they are assigned.
As a check against the perceptions of the HRM specialists
concerning how well they think they are performing, the same
set of questions can be asked of the commanding officer of
the unit that received the services. The major thrust of
the HRMSS is to provide assistance to command. As noted in
chapter II, the HRM Survey reflects how the individual crew
members perceive various aspects of the command to which they
are assigned. It was stated that these perceptions (right,
wrong, or indifferent) constituted reality for those indivi-
duals at the time they completed the survey, assuming honesty
in their responses.
This same idea is also applicable to a commanding officer
He too is an individual with biases, and he is the primary
customer that the HRMC/D attempts to serve. One measure of
the service he receives is his own perception of the service,
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right, wrong, or indifferent. If he is pleased with what
the HRM specialists do, his continuing support for his
improvement program will probably be a major factor in its
successful implementation and operation. If he is displeased
or indifferent to what the HRM specialists do, the success
or sustenance of a planned unit improvement program will
probably be limited. The two foregoing statements suggest
that the commanding officer is the major driving force behind
what his unit accomplishes. Indeed, this is one of the major
assumptions of the HRMSS. Without the support of the
commanding officer, there seems to be little sense in trying
to effect improvement in a unit by "outsiders." With his
support and with his capacity to rearrange his priorities
and allocate his resources accordingly, any improvement
program has a correspondingly greater chance of success.
Therefore, though the commanding officer mi g Fit not be the
focus of HRAV activity, it is he who must perceive the
possible benefit to his unit of full participation in the
HRAV. It is the HRM specialist who must provide the
commanding officer with this perception. If the commanding
officer does not perceive benefit, the HRAV process will
probably have very little imoact no matter how well the
activities are mechanically performed by the HRM specialist.
Assuming, then, that the HRMC/D knows what its
specialists are to accomplish, certain questions can be asked
of those specialists in an effort to determine how well the
various steps of the HRAV process are being performed. As
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a check against the perceptions of the HRM specialists, the
same questions can be asked of the commanding officer for
whom the service are provided. The responses from the two
sets of questions can then be compared. It is presumed, if
the HRAV activities are done well or even just adequately,
that the responses to the two sets of questions will be
essentially the same. If the responses are significantly
different, then the HRMC/D has indications of those areas
where the services provided require improvement or where the
specialists require further training or guidance.
If the proper questions are asked and if both parties
are honest in their answers, the case made in the foregoing
paragraphs can be stated as a testable hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 1 . The comparison of evaluation question-
naires obtained from the HRM specialists and the commanding
officers will show no significant differences in the responses
over the entire set of questions aksed for assessment of how
well the various HRAV and related activities were accomplished.
C. ASSESSMENT OF HRAV IMPACT ON UNIT OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE
Once it has been determined that the HRAV and related
activities are being performed as well as possible by HRM
specialists, the other major question concerning the impact
of the HRAV on the operational performance of the unit can
be addressed. It was stated elsewhere in this paper that
impact assessment is difficult if the objectives for which
positive impact is desired are not specifically defined.
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In U.S. military history it has been traditional for
senior commanders to speak and provide direction to subor-
dinates in general terms. The details of accomplishment are
left to the discretion of the subordinates who must comply
with the senior commander's direction. In a notable example
in 1864, Grant told Sherman,
"You I propose to move against Johnston's army,
to break it up and get into the interior of the
enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all
the damage you can against their war resources." [Ref. 13]
History has recorded the success of Grant's subordinate in
this venture. More recently, Admiral Nimitz's orders to
Fletcher and Spruance for joining the Battle of Midway were
to
,
"...inflict maximum damage on the enemy by
employing strong attrition tactics..." [Ref. 14]
Again, history records the success of the subordinates.
In current military management by senior commanders,
this same tradition is apparent in the general guidance
provided in instructions promulgated by higher authority
which apply to an entire military department such as the Navy.
The generality of the guidance in OPNAVINST 5300. 6B has been
alluded to elsewhere in this paper. The details of the
objective "To improve unit readiness and operational
capability" are left to subordinate levels to effect. By
extension, what constitutes improved unit readiness and
operational capability is also left to subordinates for
interpretation. Lacking specific direction, there are as
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many interpretations of improved unit readiness and opera-
tional capability as there are subordinates who concern
themselves with the problem. This in turn leads to
improvement actions which are as many and varied as the
interpretations of what the problem involves.
While attempting to effect general Navy operational
improvement in this fashion may be an effective way to
proceed, it does create difficulties in management for top
level personnel. Seniors can discern improvement oriented
activity among subordinates, but they do not know what the
end result will be unless there exists defined criteria with
which to measure improvement and a functioning information
feedback system which provides them the data. The Navy
command inspection program for various aspects of unit
readiness is a convenient example of a system wherein criteria
are specifically defined and information is fed back to top
management levels. Unfortunately for the HRMSS, no formalized
mechanism for assessing effectiveness or impact exists, nor
is there a formalized procedure for providing general feedback
information to senior managers.
If HRMSS objectives are being met, it seems that
improvements should be apparent in recognizable and accepted
performance indicators in a unit as a result of the unit's
participation in an HRAV. For example, it is reasonable to
expect increased retention of eligible personnel. It is
reasonable to expect a reduction of the number of disciplinary
infractions by unit personnel. It is reasonable to expect to
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see a unit achieve higher inspection scores. It is reasonable
to expect to see improved morale. Any or all of these benefits
and more should accrue if the objectives of the HRMSS are
being met.
As with the case for determining how well the HRAV
activities are done, the considerations presented in this
section for determining the impact of the HRAV in participating
commands can be reduced to a testable hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 2 . A significantly greater change in
performance in recognizable and generally accepted performance
indicators will occur in the positive direction for units that
have participated in an HRAV when compared to a similar group
of units that have not participated in an HRAV.
The design and application of procedures to test these
two hypotheses was the major thrust of the effort for this
study. The following two chapters provide the design descrip-
tion and the results of its application respectively.
D. SUMMARY
Though the total annual cost of operating the HRMC/D's
is relatively insignificant, it is money which could perhaps
be used in other productive pursuits. However, if the
objectives of the HRMSS are being met, the price is small
and worth the expense.
Detailed examination of the HRMSS objectives as stated
in OPNAVINST 5300. 6B raises a host of definitional questions
which defy general answers because the statements of the
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objectives are not specific. This leads to individual low
level interpretation of what is required, and it leads to
individual improvement actions which are difficult to aggre^
gate such that general Navy improvement can be ascertained.
Assessment of the HRAV seems to be dependent on the
answers to the two questions:
1. How well are the HRAV and related activities
performed within a unit?




IV. PRELIMINARY EVALUATION SYSTEM DESIGN
A. OVERVIEW
The need for assessing the impact of the HRAV in
operational units has been recognized for some time. Many
researchers have addressed the problem both officially and
unofficially. As a result of some of this work, significant
changes have occurred in the system. For example, OPNAVINST
5300. 6B is itself the result of evolutionary changes in the
HRMSS based on experience gained since the system was first
conceived and implemented. Another significant change was
the reduction of the number of core questions in the HRM
Survey from 103 in the early version of the "Sea" survey to
the present 88.
Such changes as have been made to date have presumably
resulted in a better and more effective system. Supposedly,
the current system is more closely aligned to the requirements
of the commands it is designed to serve.
Assuming that the current HRMSS is the best system that
can be devised for the present, the need to be able to assess
HRAV impact is all the more important if the system is to
remain responsive to continually changing fleet requirements.
Similarly, impact assessment can be used as one basis for
efficient allocation of resources.
After citing several recent attempts to evaluate the
impact of the HRAV, the final section of this chapter offers
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a design for evaluation of the impact of the HRAV which
builds and expands upon work done in previous studies. This
design is based on the two hypotheses stated in chapter III
of this paper.
B. EXAMPLES OF PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO ASSESS HRAV IMPACT
The need to have a method for assessing the impact of
the HRAV in operational units was recognized very early after
the system was first implemented in 1971. In that year, a
study done at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School by C. C.
Hooper [Ref. 15] proposed an evaluation methodology.
Hooper's evaluation system was based on comparison of the
results of two consecutive surveys taken in the same unit,
one prior to an HRAV and the other some time subsequent to
the unit's participation in the HRAV.
Hooper's survey contained items which required two
answers. The answers to each question were of the respective
forms "As it is" and "As we would like to see it." The
questions themselves depicted several situations concerning
various aspects of organizational climate. Presumably the
survey indicated a gap of significant distance between the
aggregated answers for "As it is" and those for "As we would
like to see it."
The gaps appearing in the initial survey formed the
basis of HRAV improvement activities. Impact could be
assessed by conductinga second survey in the same unit some
time after the HRAV. By comparison of the gaps on the second
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survey with those on the initial survey, HRAV alleged impact
could be determined along the selected dimensions of the
survey instrument.
Though Hooper's proposal was a seemingly reasonable
approach, the survey form on which it was based did not
survive in subsequent system evolution. Though Hooper's
approach was not officially implemented, the underlying
concept of comparison over two consecutive periods did
survive. It is implicit in the availability of follow-on
assistance that provision for a second survey be available to
a unit following completion of a scheduled HRAV.
In 1975, a study officially sanctioned by the program
sponsor was jointly made by Dr. Kent Crawford and Edmund
Thomas of the U.S. Navy Personnel Research and Development
Center, San Diego, CA. [Ref. 16] The results of their study
were published in a report entitled "Human Resource Mangement
and Non-judicial Punishment Rates on Navy Ships." As the
title suggests, the study attempted to determine whether or
not there was any correlation between the organizational
climate in Navy units and the units' performance in a
recognizable and generally accepted performance indicator
area, e.g., Battle Problem scores in Refresher Training.
The researchers compared unit response aggregates for
several of the HRM Survey indexes with the units' rates of
non-judicial punishment (NJP). As a result of their study
Crawford and Thomas found,
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"...it appears that the dimensions measured by
the HRM Survey make significant contributions to the
variance of NJP rates on Navy ships. Lower NJP rates
were consistently found among those commands in which
the human organizational system was perceived to be
most effective ..."
It is interesting that the researchers used words like
"appears" and "significant contributions." The word "appears
does not connote that such findings are definite. Similarly,
the words "significant contributions" do not convey exactly
what the contributions are. Also of interest is that this
study, like Hooper's before it, was based entirely on the
responses to survey questions; that is, to people's percep-
tions and not on direct observations of their behavior.
In June, 1976 the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic
Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) reported to the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) the results of his own study made concerning assessment
of the impact of Human Resource Management in LANTFLT units
[Ref. 3]. This study used the previously cited Crawford/
Thomas report as a basis. NJP statistics were obtained for
LANTFLT units which had experienced HRAV . The periods
observed were three months prior to the unit's participation
in an HRAV and six months following completion of the HRAV.
It was first observed that,
"... the impact of HRM assistance may be
measureable by performance criteria earlier in
small units. Since the method of providing HRM
assistance to both large and small units has been
virtually identical, it is concluded that the
method of providing HRM assistance to large units
needs to be refined in order to achieve earlier




This is the first time in the author's experience that
official recognition has been given to the possibility that
the HRAV process as presently constituted might not have
universal application throughout all Navy commands.
The report goes on further to say,
"It is considered very significant that the
units that were categorized as having the most
potential for improvement did in fact experience
a very significant improvement, in terms of NJP's.
It is apparent from this data that the HRM effort
in LANTFLT is producing positive results."
Potential for improvement was determined by separating the
sample units into three groups, those having low, medium, and
high NJP rates respectively. The quoted statement suggests
that the HRAV process has the most effective positive impact
in those which by some standard are most in need of the
introduction of HRMSS concepts and resultant improved leader-
ship and management practices. This seems intuitively
reasonabl e
.
The conclusions of this study, like those cited for the
Crawford/Thomas study above, do not mention specifically how
the HRAV might be conducted differently in large units as
compared to how-it is conducted in small units to produce
positive results in a more timely fashion. Similarly, the
phrase "... apparent ... that the HRM effort in LANTFLT units
is producing positive results" does not suggest specifically
what is being done to produce positive results.
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Common among all the studies cited is the idea of impact
on unit performance as a result of participation in an HRAV
.
The dates of the studies suggest both that the problem has
been long recognized and that the need for evaluation metho-
dology still exists. It is contended that though the cited
studies were proper exercises in attempting to evaluate the
impact of the HRAV in operational units, they did not go far
enough. All of them, however, touched on the two hypotheses
of this study. All three suggest measurement of HRAV impact
by recognizable unit performance criteria. The CINCLANTFLT
study also suggested a question concerning how well the
various HRAV's are conducted in different units.
C. AN APPROACH TO ASSESSMENT OF HRAV IMPACT
The hypotheses stated in chapter III are repeated here
for convenience.
HYPOTHESIS NUMBER ONE . The comparison of evaluation
questionnaires obtained from the HRM specialists and the
commanding officers will show no significant differences in
the responses over the entire set of questions asked to
assess how well the various HRAV and related activities were
accomplished. Acceptance of this hypothesis would increase
confidence in the instrument (see Appendix B for acceptance
rationale) as an indicator of HRAV performance.
HYPOTHESIS NUMBER TWO . No statistically significant
change will occur in units having participated in an HRAV as
compared to a control group of similar units that have not
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participated in an HRAV (stated in the opposite sense from
the statement in chapter III). Rejection of this hypothesis
and a "t" test showing positive difference would indicate
some influence of the HRAV. (See Appendix B for rejection
rationale and "t" test.)
Taking each hypothesis in order the following approach is
offered as a way of assessing the impact of the HRAV on the
unit performance of operational Navy commands.
1 . Test Approach for Hypothesis Number One
In attempting to assess how well the various HRAV
and related activities are done by HRM specialists working
in an operational unit, it was noted elsewhere in this paper
that no official and standardized performance criteria for
HRM specialists have been developed. Lacking such criteria
it was assumed that two primary sources of information
existed for assessing how well the HRAV and related activities
are done. These sources are the Human Resource Management
Support Team (HRMST) which provides the services and the
commanding officer of the unit that receives the services.
Presumably the HRMST knows what it is trying to accomplish
generally at each step of the process. As a check of their
perceptions, the commanding officer of the unit receiving
the services can be asked what services he thinks he actually
received. If the HRAV and related activities are done well
or adequately, the answers to questions asked of the HRMST
and a corresponding commanding officer concerning how well
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various activities of the HRAV process were done should be
essentially the same.
With that in mind two questionnaires were designed
to test hypothesis number one. Both questionnaires contained
the same questions. On the one hand the HRM specialists were
asked how well they thought they performed the various
activities in the unit to which they were assigned. On the
other hand the commanding officer of the unit receiving the
services was asked the same set of questions to determine
what he thought of the services he received.
The answers to the two sets of questions were to
be made on a convenient scale for comparative purposes. If
the questions were properly designed, the two sets of answers
should be essentially the same. If they were, then a value
judgement could be placed on whether or not the HRAV was
done well or at least adequately by the specialists assigned
to provide the services. Alternatively, if the answers were
materially different, the need for further investigation would
be readi ly apparent .
The questionnaires designed for this purpose were
forwarded to three of the four HRMC's in the United States
for trial use during the period 1 May through. 31 July, 1976.
Appendix A contains the text of the questionnaires and the
text of the letter describing how they were to be used.
Based on the assumption that the commanding officer of the
unit which receives the services is the individual wh.o must
be convinced of the benefit of participation in an HRAV, the
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questions, as designed, placed the "burden of proof" largely
on the HRMST providing the services. For example, each
question asked was of the form:
a. HRMST - "Did you do X?"
b. Unit commanding officer - "Was X done?"
Those answering the questions were asked to
provide answers on a Likert type scale of five possible
answers ranging from "To a Very Little Extent" to "To a ^Jery
Great Extent." The reader will note that this is the same
form of answer currently used for questions in the HRM Survey.
A scale of possible answers rather than a simple "Yes or No"
format was used so that the range of answers could be later
subdivided and a value judgement assigned to each subdivision.
Thus all answers (HRM specialists' and commanding officers')
falling in a low range would indicate that the activities
examined were not done particularly well. At a somewhat
higher range it could be said that the activities were done
adequately. At yet a higher range it could be said that the
activities were done well.
The questions themselves were based on and
developed from the author's experience as an HRM specialist.
The whole set of questions for each party attempted to capture
what appear to be relevant requirements for success, both for
the entire HRAV process as well as for each discrete step of
the process. Because of the sequential nature of the steps
in the HRAV process, it was assumed that each, question on
each questionnaire had equal weight.
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From hypothesis number one and the foregoing
discussion it was predicted that the following results would
occur :
a. The answers received on the two forms would
show essentially a one for one correspondence for each set of
questions when plotted one against the other. This suggests
a relationship such as that shown in Figure 4 below.




All the answers for all the questions on each questionnaire
could be totaled and the totaled scores plotted. Then a
line could be fitted to all the plotted points. Assuming a
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one for one relationship, the resultant line should be linear
and of the form for a straight line from mathematics,
Y = a + bX (where "a" is the intercept of the line with the
vertical axis (Y) and "b" is the "slope" of the line). If
the relationship of Figure 4 is true for the test of hypo-
thesis number one, then the value of "a" should be close to
zero and the value of "b" should be close to one.
b. The scale along the two axes of the plot would
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c. Most questionnaires would reveal answers to
the questions in the range of value three or above. This is
based upon the idea that it is unlikely that an HRM specialist
will try to do a job that is less than adequate. Any
differences in answers between the two parties could then
be accounted for as differences in interpretation. The
differences should not, however, be further away than one
division from each other. That is, a specialist's answer
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of "To a Great Extent" to any question should result in a
corresponding commanding officer's answer of "To Some Extent,"
"To a Great Extent," or "To a Very Great Extent." This, in
turn, should result in a plot of answers which are clustered
in the upper right region of the graph. However, a line
fitted to those plotted answers should, when extrapolated,
be of the form shown in Figure 4.
d. From the process outlined in steps a through
c above, it could be determined that an HRAV was done well or
not. That is, given a sufficient number of pairs of question-
naires, the "best fit" line could be used as a reference and
a standard. Examination of where the plotted pair of points
falls on the graph with respect to the vertical axis intercept
and the slope of the line would indicate that the HRAV was
done well, then the questions contained in the two question-
naires could be used as the basis for further investigation
and any necessary corrective activity.
2 . Limitations of the Test Approach for Hypothesis One
a. Time versus Specificity Tradeoff. At the
outset it became apparent that questions designed with the
desired specificity called for throughout this paper would
result in questionnaires of prohibitive length requiring a
great deal of time and effort for each party to complete.
The resulting questions, therefore, are, of necessity, wery
general in nature. Albeit general, the questions still
attempt to capture what, in the author's experience, is the
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essence of what is required for success at the level of the
entire process and for each step within the HRAV process.
In addition, since this study sought only to offer an approach
to HRAV impact assessment, the actual content of the questions
was (at this point) considered relatively unimportant. That
is, the results of this particular study would be of less
importance than the method itself.
b. The Assumption of Factor Equality. The
assumption of equal weight for each question might not be
valid if one considers the possibility that certain steps of
the HRAV process are relatively more important than others.
Again, if the basic approach is valid, the specific weights
of the questions are immaterial at this point, and they can
be assigned later as more experience is gatned.
c. Perceptual Bias. The implicit assumption of
honesty and objectivity on the part of those answering the
questions might be invalid. One can encounter commanding
officers who do not particularly support the HRAV effort in
their units no matter how well the HRM specialists do their
work. As a result, the commanding officer's answers to
evaluation questions might be more negative than is warranted
by the work done by the specialists. The opposite possibility
also exists. A commanding officer's optimism and enthusiasm
for the HRAV concepts and processes may result in more




Alternatively, one can encounter HRM
specialists who are relatively incompetent. Such personnel
may not realize or may not admit that their work is less than
adequate. As a result they might blame unit personnel (such
as the commanding officer) for any resulting negative impres-
sion in the unit concerning work done during the HRAV process.
It is thought that this particular possibility can be reduced
by proper design of the questions asked of each party. It is
admitted that the questions used for this study might not be
good enough to reduce the possibility, but it is also thought
that they can be redesigned at leisure if the basic approach
is considered worthy of more rigorous development and for
eventual implementation throughout the system.
In an attempt to reduce this possibility for
this study, the HRMC's were requested to have the question-
naires answered by only the commanding officer of the unit
participating in the HRAV and by the team leader of the HRMST
assigned to provide the services to that unit. It was
assumed that though the commanding officer of the unit might
not be directly involved in the specific HRAV activities, he,
as an individual, would still have to be knowledgeable
concerning both with what activities were done and the reasons
for conducting those particular activities. His knowledge of
these factors was thought to be a prime necessary ingredient
to continuing unit improvement activity subsequent to the
completion of the HRAV. As a result, the commanding officer,
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more than anyone else onboard the unit, must be able to
perceive that the HRAV process was done well in his unit, and
he, more than anyone else onboard, must perceive the possible
benefit to his unit of full participation in the HRAV.
For the specialists' part, the HRMST team
leader was considered to be in a better Dosition to answer
evaluation questions than the special i st (s ) who actually
provided the services to the unit. The HRMST team leader is
relatively closer to the policy and decision making levels
of the HRMC/D command structure. Presumably he has more
complete knowledge of what the fleet commander in chief
requires for program accomplishment. It is he who assigns
specialists to provide services for particular units based
on their operational experience, their seniority, their
demonstrated competence, and their availability. Finally,
the HRMST team leader is removed from the possibly emotional
involvement of the speci al i s t (s ) who actually provide(s)
the services (unless, as happens occasionally, he provides
the services himself), and he can therefore answer the
questions somewhat more objectively.
The disadvantages inherent in having the
questionnaires answered be these two individuals are twofold.
The answers they provide might not be based on first hand
knowledge of what actually occurred, but rather on the
filtered second hand information provided to them by
subordinate personnel. Secondly, the interpretations placed
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by different individuals to the same questions (both across
HRMST team leader and commanding officer communities) might
not reflect what actually occurred in a given situation.
d. Subjectivity of the Questions. In the absence
of specifically defined objectives and evaluation criteria,
the questions used for this study were subjective. Though it
may be necessary to use subjective questions until more
objective measures are developed, the understanding and
interpretation of all who use the subjective measures should
common. Similarly understanding and interpretation of what
information the questions are designed to provide should be
agreed upon and common.
e. Environmental Constraints. The questionnaires
designed and used for this study did not account for such
environmental factors as HRAV activity scheduling difficul-
ties, interference of the HRAV activities with other required
unit evolutions, where and when the HRAV activities were
physically conducted, etc. The researcher's inability to
control such variables limits the conclusions that can be
drawn from this study, and it limits the confidence that can
be placed on the questionnaires that were used as valid and
effective evaluation devices. It is emphasized, again, that
the results of this particular study are of less relative
importance than the merit of the approach used itself.
With the reservations noted in the foregoing
limitations to the approach for assessing HRAV effectiveness,
the approach was attempted as described. The results of the
trial approach are contained in the next chapter.
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3. Test Approach for Hypothesis Number Two
In summary, the purpose of this study was to
determine a way to assess the effectiveness of HRAV's and
their impact on the operational performance of the units in
which the process is applied. This presupposes a contingent
ability to determine first whether or not the HRAV and
related activities were done well or adequately by the HRM
specialists assigned to provide the services. Second,
assuming the HRAV is done well or adequately in a unit, one
should be able to expect some degree of positive change in
unit performance as measured by recognized and commonly
accepted performance criteria.
It will be remembered that one of the stated
objectives of the HRMSS in OPNAVINST 5300. 6B is "Improved
unit readiness and operational capability." Since these
terms are not more specifically defined, it is fair to presume
that unit performance improvement should be apparent in any
or all areas selected for examination. Furthermore, it can
be assumed that all units perform all of their mission
requirements to some minimum degree of acceptance and that
relative value can be measured by performance criteria such
as those outlined in the Navy's inspection system. Since all
units are examined periodically, the only apparent difference
in units of the same general types could be construed as
whether or not those units have participated in an HRAV.
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Such a construction must include the qualifying assumption
that one can hold factors such as change of command or
operational requirements constant.
Through random selection of performance indicators
and units for examination one can compare unit performance
in the area or areas of interest with the HRAV being the
independent variable. If the HRAV has been done well or
adequately, then one should expect to discern relatively
greater degrees of positive change or improvement for units
that have participated in an HRAV than for units that have
not experienced the HRAV. Such a comparison can be made
using basic statistical tools which are readily available.
Hypothesis Number Two postulates that there will be a
significant difference in the performance of units compared
in this fashion(even though the hypothesis is stated in the
opposite sense for the reasons indicated).
With the general ideas outlined in the foregoing
paragraphs in mind, the following approach was used to test
Hypothesis Number Two. Several units under the administra-
tive control of the Commander Naval Surface Forces, U.S.
Pacific Fleet were randomly selected. The selected units
were divided into two groups. The experiment group included
those units which had participated in an HRAV. The control
group included those units which had not experienced an HRAV




a. Unit performance during Annual Supply
Inspections (ASI's) as measured by the scores attained. The
units were observed over a period of time in which two
consecutive ASI's occurred.
b. Personnel retention rates as measured by the
number of eligible personnel reenlisted. The units were
observed over a period of time that included five consecutive
fiscal quarters.
The units selected for observation in both
groups were not matched under any sort of criteria such as
unit type, crew size, position in operating cycle, etc. The
only criteria used for selection was that all units were of
the surface community and under the same administrative
command. The second criteria was that the experiment group
experienced the HRAV between observations of performance
indicators.
It was assumed for purposes of this study
that unit performance in both these areas for the entire
SURFPAC force could be described as a normal distribution
(from statistics). That is, a plot of the performance of the
entire force would appear as depicted in Figure 5 below.
With the assumed distribution as shown in
Figure 5, any particular unit's actual performance score could
be plotted along the horizontal axis. This would show the
unit's relative performance with respect to the average




SURFACE FORCES PACIFIC FLEET UNIT PERFORMANCE
— x - PeK.f--oKMkj>Cl
Ftgure 5
If examination could be made for a unit's
relative position with respect to the mean value for the
entire force over two consecutive observations, one could
then determine relative motion of that unit's performance in
the positive or negative direction. Similarly, if one were
to compare the performance of two groups from the same
population (one group having participated in an HRAV and the
other group not having so participated) one could then deter
mine the comparative magnitude of relative motion in either
direction over the two consecutive observations. From this,
one could determine that the HRAV had the desired impact or
not as the case may be.
94

Such was the general approach used to test
Hypothesis Number Two. A random sample of 26 units within
the COMNAVSURFPAC organization was selected. A mean
retention score was calculated for the entire sample for
each fiscal quarter in the period Quarter 2, fiscal year
1975 through Quarter 2, fiscal year 1976. Additionally for
each fiscal quarter observed, a standard deviation for the
sample was calculated. Then the retention scores for all
units in the sample were converted to "normalized" t scores
for each of the fiscal quarters observed.
From this sample another smaller sample was
drawn. It included six units that had participated in an
HRAV and six units that had not. The base period selected
for observation was Quarter 3, fiscal year 1975. All of the
units that had experienced an HRAV did so during that
quarter. Normalized retention scores were noted for all
units in the smaller sample commencing in Quarter 2, fiscal
year, 1975 and for each quarter thereafter through Quarter 2,
fiscal year, 1976. That is, for the experiment group,
normalized retention scores were observed for the three
month period before the quarter in which the HRAV occurred
(Quarter 3, fiscal year, 1975), during the quarter in which
the HRAV occurred, and for each of three fiscal quarters
following the quarter in which the HRAV occurred. The
normalized retention scores for the units of the control
group were also observed for the same periods.
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For both groups in the reduced sample the
normalized retention scores were averaged for each fiscal
quqrter observed. The resultant average normalized retention
scores were then summed to determine total average motion
for units in the two groups.
Essentially the same process was used when
comparing ASI scores. The period of observation was selected
to be approximately equal to the selected for observation of
the retention scores. Unfortunately it was impossible to use
the same units for both sets of observations (retention and
ASI) because not all of the units observed for retention
experienced consecutive ASI's in the same time frame used for
observation of retention.
The random sample selected for these observa-
tions included twelve units that had and twelve units that
had not participated in an HRAV . A mean ASI score and a
standard deviation were calculated for each group, and
individual scores were normalized for two consecutive ASI's.
The difference in the two groups was that the units of the
experiment group experienced their HRAV ' s between the two
ASI 's.
The calculations done to test the two
hypotheses are contained in Appendix B. The expected results
of the calculations made to test Hypothesis Number Two were
as f ol lows :
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a. The relative positive movement of the
experiment group would be significantly greater than that of
the control group in both performance indicators observed if
the HRAV was done well or adequately.
b. If the HRAV was not done well or adequately,
the relative movement in the experiment group would be the
same, approximately, as that of the control group.
4. Limitations of the Approach Used to Test
Hypothesis Two
a. Use of Average Figures. The use of average
figures to support a position has the inherent disadvantage
of masking more specific information contained in the indivi-
dual data elements. For example, the use of average
normalized figures over two consecutive observations may
indeed indicate average motion in one direction or another.
Also, comparative observations between an experiment and a
control group can be used to indicate relative magnitude of
motion between the two groups. However, in using average
figures the extremes of values and the direction of motion
for individual units is lost.
b. Assumption of Normal Distribution for
Performance. This assumption may or may not be valid, nor
was the assumption verified by the personnel on the staff of
COMNAVSURFPAC who were interviewed by the author. The
assumption of normally distributed figures is a convenient
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one for a study such as this, but it should be verified in
a more rigorous application of the methodology offered by
this study.
c. Lack of Data for Correlation of HRAV Effective'
ness and Performance. No data were available to the author
with which to ascertain the relationship between HRAV
effectiveness (how well the HRAV was done) and improved unit
performance in areas selected for examination. Therefore, no
correlation between how well an HRAV was done and its subse-
quent impact on improved unit performance could be made.
Though such correlation was impossible for this study, it can
be made in future studies with appropriate data in sufficient
quantities and a more rigorous application of the methodology
d. Sample Size. The sample sizes of the samples
used for the observations made in this study were thought to
be too small for making statistical judgements with any
degree of confidence in their reliability. Statistical
judgements were made nonetheless with the primary purpose of
illustration of the methodology. It is anticipated that an
application of the methodology of greater rigor would be
attempted with sample sizes of sufficient magnitude to render
statistical judgements that are meaningful and reliable.
e. Assumption that the HRAV is the Only
Independent Variable. Due to the lack of control over any
of the variables or conditions under which the HRAV's were
accomplished, the assumption that the HRAV was the only
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common event to account for the differences observed in the
ASI scores or the number of personnel reenlisted between the
experiment group and the control group is tenuous at best.
For this study, the likelihood that some other factor or a
combination of other factors accounted for the differences
observed cannot be ruled out. In future applications, this
possibility should be considered.
f. Reliability and Validity of the Test
Instrument. The question implicit in this limitation is
whether or not the testing device consistently and repeatedly
measures what it purports to measure. Lack of sufficient
quantities of appropriate data and other resources precluded
reliability and validity tests for this study. However,
these too should be considered in future applications.
g. Simplicity of the Evaluation Model. One of
the original and secondary purposes of this study was to
provide evaluation methodology with which HRAV impact could
be assessed using in-house expertise. As will be shown, the
approaches offered in this study fulfill this self-imposed
requirement. However, in devising a tool simple enough for
use by laymen mathematical rigor was sacrificed to a degree.
With the reservations noted above the approach
described in the previous section was applied to assess the
impact of the HRAV on improved unit operational performance.




V. RESULTS OF THE STUDY
A. OVERVIEW
Of ninety sets of questionnaires forwarded to the three
HRMC's at Norfolk, VA, San Diego, CA, and Pearl Harbor, HI
to assess how well the HRAV was performed, twenty-seven were
returned. These sets of questionnaires covered HRAV's
conducted by all three HRMC's and their respective HRMD's
during the period 1 May through 31 July 1976. As a result of
the calculations applied to the data received, Hypothesis
Number One seems to be refuted.
The results of the approach for testing Hypothesis
Number Two likewise led to mixed results. This is not
surprising for reasons to be detailed in the following
sections of this chapter.
The final section of this chapter summarizes the results
obtained for this study. These results lead to the conclu-
sions that can be drawn from this study. These conclusions
and the recommendations which they elicit are outlined in
the following chapter. They are offered as a way for HRMSS
system managers to assess the impact of the HRAV on a unit's
operational performance.
B. ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE HRAV IS ACCOMPLISHED
From the assumptions that all questions contained in
the two questionnaires (see Appendix A) reflect the total
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essential requirements for the conduct of a successful and
effective HRAV and that all questions were of equal weight,
it was assumed that total HRAV effectiveness was the sum of
all the activities necessary to the total effort.
With this in mind, the two sets of answers received to
the ten questions on each questionnaire could be viewed in
two alternative ways. They could be compared question by
question to determine the effectiveness of each part of the
HRAV process in a particular unit. Alternatively, the values
assigned to each answer could be summed over the entire set
of questions to provide a score for the effectiveness of the
entire HRAV. The latter course was chosen for this study
because the purpose of the effort was to exaine how well the
entire HRAV was done. In this process the data for individual
questions were not lost, and they can be used at some later
time for more detailed examination on an individual case
basis .
Reexamination of the questions resulted in elimination
of one question from consideration on each questionnaire.
This question concerned whether or not the HRAV and related
activities were scheduled to accommodate the normal operating
requirements/routine of the participating unit with minimum
disruption. This question was eliminated from consideration
because it was thought that neither the unit nor the HRMC/D
could control the scheduling of HRAV and related activities
in all cases such that minimum disruption to the unit's
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normal operating requirements/routine could always be effected.
This left nine questions on each form for consideration.
With nine questions under consideration and using the
values assigned to possible answers noted in chapter IV, the
best total score that could be obtained on either questionnaire
was 45. Similarly, the lowest total score that could be
obtained on either questionnaire was nine. These two figures
suggested a range of values which could be further divided
into smaller groups. Each group could then be assigned
assessment category terminology to indicate whether or not
the HRAV was done well. This was done, and the results are




















































These assignments were then used to plot the total
score of each questionnaire in the set. The HRMST score
was plotted along the horizontal axis. The corresponding
total score for the commanding officer was plotted along the
vertical axis. Thus for any point so plotted one can
determine immediately the values of the total scores for both
the HRMST and the commanding officer of the unit that
participated in the HRAV
.
The scale along each axis was divided using the ranges
and their corresponding assessment categories shown in Table
1 above. The division lines for the three assessment
categories were extended perpendicular to their respective
axes to form a Cartesian grid in which were included all the
plotted points. The resultant graph is shown in Figure 6
bel ow
.
As expected, most of the plotted points appeared at a
value of 27 or greater on both axes. There was one notable
exception. In Figure 6, one can easily see relative
differences (in quadrants I and IV) or equalities (in
quadrants II and III) between how well the HRMST thought the
HRAV was done and how well the corresponding commanding
officer thought the HRAV was done.
Linear regression techniques were applied to determine
the line through the plotted points which best described the
relationship of all the points. In chapter IV it was
postulated that the line which best described the plotted
points would assume the relationship shown in Figure 4;
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that is, there would be a one to one relationship for the
values shown on the two axes on the average. The line was
supposed to have a Y = intercept and a slope whose value
approached unity.
The result of the linear regression was a line described
by the equation Y
c
= 36.84 + .0033X. Taken at face value,
this equation means that when X = (that is, if nothing is
perceived to have been done by an HRMST in a unit), then
Y = 36.84 Cthat is, the commanding officer of the unit
perceives that the HRAV was done well). This is clearly
impossible.
Using the assessment categories shown along the two
axes of the graph in Figure 6, the interpretation of the
line becomes more reasonable. The indication is that most
HRAV's are perceived by the commanding officers in whose
units they occur as having been done at least mechanically
well by virtue of the fact that the vertical axis intercept
value is so high. The implication of this is obvious. On
the average, no matter how well or how incompetently an
HRAV is performed, the commanding officer will be able to
perceive that the necessary activities were in fact done.
Another less obvious implication is that the effectiveness
of the HRAV might be independent of the specialists'
competence. That is, if the HRAV activities are performed
only mechanically well, they will be perceived by the
recipient as having been performed effectively.
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This last statement also seems to be supported by the
almost insignificant slope of the regression line. Here
the implication is that no matter how well the HRAV process
is performed, the perception of the commanding officers
receiving the services will be only that the activities were
done mechanically well. It should not be concluded that such
a result is necessarily bad. Rather, the result can be
interpreted as what can be expected on the average. Since,
as indicated by the high value of the vertical axis intercept
and the "flat" slope of the line, most commanding officers
perceive that HRAV ' s are performed well, it can be said that
most HRAV ' s are probably done well.
Though the graph of Figure 6 and the foregoing discussion
of its interpretation seem to refute the statement of
Hypothesis Number one, these results are not particularly
surprising. In the author's experience most of the HRMST
personnel who provide HRAV services have been dedicated and
competent. It is far easier to accept Cat this point) the
error apparent in the statement of the hypothesis than it
is to offer an indictment against the HRMST personnel and
the HRAV process they use to provide services to operational
units .
It can be concluded generally that the various HRAV and
related activities have merit in the eyes of the average
commanding officer and that the HRMST's perform those
activities at least mechanically well. Additionally, it
can be generally concluded that a great deal of extra
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personal effort on the part of the HRMST will not be
recognized by the average commanding officer. This in no
way implies that the effort should not nonetheless be made
by the HRMST. It is perhaps because of this effort that the
average HRAV is perceived by the average commanding officer
to have been done even only mechanically well.
Figure 6 also indicates two more items of possible
interest. The regression line, coupled with the super-
imposed Cartesian grid, divides the plotted points into two
major and several minor segments. For the points above the
regression line (and assuming the questions asked of the
commanding officers are the proper ones for assessing HRAV
effectiveness) it can be said that the HRAV was in fact done
well whether or not the HRMST thinks it was done well.
Additionally, since the regression line appears nearly at
the boundary between "adequate" and "well done," it can be
said that points appearing below the regression line indicate
that the HRAV ' s were performed adequately or not particularly
well as the case may be (and if the definitions of the grid
coordinates are accepted).
Figure 6 indicates that 66% of the HRAV's are considered
to have been done well and 29.6% are considered to have been
done adequately. Since one of the purposes of the HRMSS is
to provide assistance to command, it seems as though this
purpose is being fulfilled in nearly all cases. The graph
shows one notable exception.
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In this case which can be examined in the raw data, the
commanding officer made the following comments.
"...they impressed me as being totally divorced
from the mission and needs of a sea-going command.
The team seemed to be possessed with the idea that
participative type management was the only solution
for all problems regardless of the employment of the
command. They also seemed to be enthralled with the
esoterica of the computer runs, yet at the same time
unable to translate what it really meant. While the
general remarks about the data were indeed
gratifying, they told me little I was unaware of
already, and frankly, had there been any big
surprises, I would have felt remiss as a C.O. The
cost and effort expended seem totally inappropriate
to the benefit gained.
Throughout the HRAV period I felt I was
associating with personnel who somehow weren't
part of the Navy. At one point I even had to ask
the team leader to correct a totally inappropriate
and non-regulation haircut on one of the team members.
On the positive side, the AAP development
sessions were generally constructive, and they
provided the catalyst needed to take an in-depth
look at what was required for a good, realistic,
and workable AAP.
The strongest part of the program appears to
have been the training of the CTT. This training
and the subsequent seminars on Racism and Military
Rights and Responsibilities has been very well
received at all levels, and is, in my opinion, a
fine tool to help us achieve Phase II goals. The
service provided here is most sincerely appreciated."
It must be remembered at the outset that this is only
one of a total number of 27 HRAV's plotted in Figure 6 for
the period of observation, and in no way does it reflect the
general trend. It is taken out of context because it is
illustrative of the sorts of things that can happen during




The negative comments did not so much concern the HRAV
activities and how they were done as they did the impression
left on the commanding officer by the HRM SDecialists who
did the work. In fact the positive comments concerning the
activities conducted for the Phase II Equal Opportunity/Race
Relations Program indicated that the mechanical activities
were done rather well.
Presumably because of the negative impression left on
the commanding officer by the specialists (and it need not
have been all the specialists on the team as implied in the
comments) that individual sees little benefit that was gained
or (in the author's opinion) little benefit to be gained from
further pursuit of the effort following the HRAV.
Notice from Figure 6 that in this case the HRMST thought
they had done well in their effort. Though this may perhaps
have been true, they still failed apparently to win the
support of the commanding officer, not because the HRAV
process or activities were at fault but because the HRMST
apparently misread the situation. Perhaps they did not
appreciate the possibility that the commanding officer might
be as "smart" as they think they are or that he might know
his command as well as they though they did.
The attempted "sale" of participative management as a
panacea (if this is what actually occurred) indicates a
misreading of the commanding officer's perceived needs or
desires on the part of the HRMST. Alternatively, it indicates
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that the HRMST tried to move the unit to its point of view
before the commanding officer was ready to go. The haircut
problem is so basic and obvious that nothing more need be
said concerning it.
This example has been dealt with at length not because
it is typical but because it is extreme and because it clearly
indicates the importance of the role of the HRM specialists
in providing HRAV and related services to an operational unit.
In contrast, this leads to consideration of the more typical
cases .
It was stated earlier that the plotted points of Figure
6 and the corresponding regression line seemed to refute the
statement of Hypothesis Number One. Since this was a some-
what surprising initial result, two statistical tests were
done to explain the difference between the anticipated results
and those that occurred.
A "Chi Square" test (see Appendix B) was performed to
assess the acceptability of the hypothesis, and the degree of
correlation between HRMST and commanding officer total scores
was calculated. The "Chi Square" test indicated that the
hypothesis as stated could be accepted. The correlation
calculations resulted in a correlation factor of r = 0.0031
(almost no correlation at all) between the two sets of
questionnaire answers.
The standard error of the estimate was calculated for




for the standard error of the estimate indicated that the
regression line shown in Figure 6 adequately described the
plotted points.
Since the "Chi Square" test indicated that there should
be no material difference between the scores obtained by the
HRMST and the corresponding commanding officer, and since the
regression line was verified by the small standard error of
the estimate, the fact of nearly zero correlation between the
two scores presents a dichotomy which is difficult to account
for, but which can perhaps be explained by one or a combina-
tion of the following possible reasons:
1. Neither the techniques used here or in any other
statistical techniques that measure or express the relation-
ships among variables can prove beyond all doubt that one
variable is the cause and one or more variables the effect(s)
Therefore a measure such as the coefficient of correlation
does not prove the existence of a cause and effect
relationship between two variables X and Y, nor does it
negate the existence of such a relationship. The low
correlation factor in this case speaks about very little
association between what the HRMST says about an HRAV on the
one hand and what the corresponding commanding officer says
on the other.
2. Extrapolation of the regression line beyond the
range of observed data in either direction does nothing to
indicate that the relationship is valid in those areas where
data are non-existent. For example, extrapolation of the
111

line calculated in this case to the vertical axis indicates
that commanding officers perceive that the items tested by
the questionnaire were done well (e.g., Y = 36.84) when, in
fact, nothing was perceived to have been done by the HRMST
(e.g., X = 0). Such a result is clearly impossible. Without
specific information about the areas outside the range of
observed data, it is simply unknown what the appropriate
estimating device is.
3. In a situation such as this case where the indica-
tion of correlation between the two sets of scores is
extremely small (or correspondingly in cases where the
coefficient of correlation "r" is extremely large, e.g.,
r = 1), one would be reluctant to conclude that no
correlation exists. One would rather begin to suppose the
existence of other variables not accounted for in the
calculations. Three such possible variables come to mind in
this case.
a. The perceptions of the commanding officers
and HRMST team leaders, and/or their respective interpreta-
tions of the meanings of the questions, were completely
different when answering essentially the same questions.
b. The questions themselves were improperly




c. The roles and needs of the commanding officer
and the HRMST are so completely different that their respec-
tive perceptions are equally disparate.
It was suspected that these latter three factors accounted
most for the dichotomy between the hypothesis as stated and
the results obtained.
The results do not indicate that the hypothesis is in
error. They do indicate, however, the need for more
rigorous work to test the hypothesis. Such work requires
properly designed evaluation questionnaires which provide
the desired information while simultaneously reducing the
possibility of perceptual and i nterpretational differences
among those parties who answer the questions.
Additionally, having designed an appropriate and
adequate evaluation instrument (perhaps using unobtrusive
measures), one should ensure that the sample size is large
enough to be representative of the population in which one
is interested and to make the statistical inferences drawn
from the data more meaningful. It was recognized in this
case that a sample size of 27 may not have been adequate to
test the hypothesis and prove its veracity or lack thereof.
With these thoughts in mind, the 26 points plotted in
Figure 6 which are clustered in the upper right region
indicate that 66% of the HRAV's are considered to have been
done well and that 29.6% are considered to have been done
adequately. The vertical divisions of the grid show the
113

correspondence between how well the HRMST think they
performed as opposed to how well corresponding commanding
officers think the HRAV was performed.
Quadrant II is of limited interest since it shows the
correspondence of opinion hypothesized. Indeed the greatest
percentage of the plotted points fall within this quadrant
thus lending credence to the hypothesis.
Quadrant III also shows general correspondence of
opinion, but one wonders what was done or not done to result
in these perceptions on the parts of both players. It would
seem that further investigation would reveal what happened
and would point the way to what could be done to raise both
perceptions to the level of quadrant II.
Quadrant I seems to support the statement made earlier
that the perception of how well the HRAV is done on the part
of the commanding officer should be equal to or greater than
the perception of the HRMST on a quantitative basis.
To a lesser degree, the points on quadrant IV are
illustrative of the example described in detail above.
Though the HRMST thought they performed well, the commanding
officer with whom they worked did not agree. This, again,
keys the question, "Why?" As noted for quadrant III, further
investigation would probably reveal what could be done to
raise the quantitative level of the commanding officer's
perceptions in these cases.
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Even assuming these interpretations of the results to
be in error, the ability to plot the points and assign them
to an assessment category provides the HRMC/D a more objective
tool for evaluation of HRAV effectiveness than has heretofore
been available. This tool can also provide the following
desirable by-products:
a. It can be standardized for use throughout the
system, thus providing top management levels with a Navy-wide
view of HRAV effectiveness.
b. It can be used locally to provide the HRMC/D
a way to evaluate its procedures and its HRM specialists.
c. It can be used, after sufficient data have
been accumulated, as the basis for future changes in HRMSS
policies and in the procedures by which those policies are
implemented.
d. It can be used as the basis for development
of internal HRMC/D training activities for HRM specialists.
e. After accumulation of sufficient data, it can
be used to predict the impact of the HRAV on unit performance
with some degree of certainty and confidence.
C. ASSESSMENT OF HRAV IMPACT ON UNIT OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE
With regard to the impact of the HRAV on unit retention
and ASI scores, two-way analysis of variance techniques were
applied to the data. After correcting the retention rates
for size of the unit, it was found that the HRAV versus
non-HRAV units were not significantly different in their
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reenlistment efforts; nor was significant difference found
when ASI scores were compared. At best, on the basis of
accumulated raw scores for both retention rates and ASI's,
one can assert that there is an apparent trend in the desired
direction as one compares units that experienced the HRAV
with those that did not.
When looking at retention rates of HRAV units versus
non-HRAV units over a fifteen month period one sees a gain
of + 0.7099 for the HRAV units and a decline of - 0.1843 for
the non-HRAV units. Both figures are based on average
normalized retention scores for both groups.
Retention
Mean Sqaure (time periods) = 0.2433
Mean Square [units) = 1.378772
Mean Square (group) = 0.8376
Mean Square (interaction) = 1.9842




Mean Square (time periods) = 0.02475
Mean Square (units) = 45.4222
Mean Square (group) - 20.3974
Mean Square (interaction) = 28.3105





Collation of the ASI scores over at least two inspections
shows a movement of + 0.1339 for the HRAV units and a movement
of +0.0079 for the non-HRAV units. These figures are also
based on average normalized ASI scores for both groups.
The frustration of this analysis is heightened as one
realizes that two simple but missing links preclude further
investigation. If the researcher had access to the identity
and the operational scores of the HRAV and non-HRAV units
across all measures one could perform an analysis of covariance
to study the combined treatment effect upon these variables.
If one had a reliable evaluation of the HRAV for each
unit, one could also study the impact of effective HRAV's
upon operational outputs. In short, a well-designed evalua-



















Denying the researcher access to any one of the factors A
through D makes firm conclusions impossible.
As noted earlier, both the NPRDC and CINCLANTFLT studies
found positive correlation between either aspects of
organizational climate and non-judicial punishment rates or
HRAV impact and non-judicial punishment rates respectively.
The observation of unit retention and ASI scores done for
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this study goes one step further than the previous studies
by attempting to compare the difference in performance
between the experiment and control units. The results of
this study with respect to positive HRAV impact on improved
unit performance are inconclusive. The apparent positive
trend alluded to earlier is supportive of the findings of
the previous studies.
It can be reasonably concluded that the HRAV has a
definite positive impact in some areas of unit performance.
It cannot be concluded, however, that the HRAV has positive
impact or even that it has impact at all for all areas of
unit performance. This is illustrated by the results
obtained for the retention and ASI data cited above. It
would seem that each performance indicator of interest would
have to be examined individually to determine whether or not
the HRAV has positive impact on unit performance.
One final implication of comparison of the results of
testing for HRAV impact on retention and ASI performance is
that the impact of the HRAV is more easily observable when
performance indicator areas of more specific and immediate
interest to the unit are included as specific goals of the
HRAV. Such indicators are presumed to be items such as
non-judicial punishment, retention, ASI's, etc. which are a
direct reflection of the interest of the command.
While correlational studies provide interesting analyses
of significant associations, they cannot impute causality.
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Perceptions of organizational climate as derived during
HRAV's can indeed be correlated with operational outputs, but
causal impact cannot be inferred. Thus a more rigorous and
complete analysis is in order. Proposals for such an analysis
are offered in the next chapter.
D. SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY
With certain reservations as noted in chapter IV, the
methodology used for this study can be used to determine both
how well the HRAV and related activities are performed and
some degree of positive impact of the HRAV on unit operational
performance. Though the original hypotheses were not
sustained totally, the results obtained are reasonable. The
results indicate that an HRAV evaluation tool can be devised.
The methodology offered in this study can be used as the
basis for construction of the instrument.
The results showed that HRAV effectiveness can indeed
be assessed relatively objectively if certain conditions
(outlined in the next chapter) exist. Additionally,
evaluation of the conduct of the HRAV in this fashion can
lead to other desirable by-products after sufficient
cupporting data are accumulated.
The results of the calculations made to test the second
hypothesis indicate that positive impact is observable but
not yet provable. Unfortunately, this study was unable to
draw a direct relationship between HRAV effectiveness and
the resulting impact on unit operational performance.
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Necessary data to bridge this step were not released to the
author. It is, however, thought that the groundwork for
establishing such a relationship has been done in the
methodology offered in this study. If the approach offered
herein is deemed to have merit, then further development and
accumulation of sufficient appropriate data is anticipated
to yield the necessary ingredients for the desired association
to be amde.
Leg it tm ate researchers must be given access to the data
for a period long enough to gather longitudinal and cross
tabulated information. Appropriate records must be kept of
the effectiveness of the HRAV interventions.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
That the purpose of this study, to provide a methodology
with which to assess HRAV impact on unit operational
performance, has been met is subject to verification by more
rigorous development and application of the methods offered.
The results obtained by this study are not conclusive, but
they do indicate the potential efficacy of the methodology.
HRAV impact assessment should include consideration of
how well the HRAV process is performed by HRM specialists who
provide HRMSS services to operational units. Only after this
question is answered can direct association between the HRAV
and improved unit performance be attempted such that a causal
relationship is clearly established with certainty. This
study has provided a way to approach obtaining meaningful
answers to both companion and sequentially related questions.
Lacking standard and specific criteria for evaluating
the effectiveness of what is done by HRM specialists in a
unit during the HRAV process, the use of questionnaires for
both parties (HRMST and corresponding unit commanding officer)
provides the HRMC/D a way to begin to. establish evaluation
criteria. If the questions asked of each party are properly
designed to:
a. Provide the desired information, specifically; and
b. to reduce the possibility of perceptual and/or
interpretive differences among the parties answering the
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questions, then the answers by both parties are anticipated
to provide information to the HRMC/D concerning the effective-
ness of their product. Additionally, such information can
yield the following desirable by-products:
1. A measure of effectiveness for how well the
HRAV was done.
2. A way for HRM specialists to determine the
strengths and weaknesses of the work they do.
3. A way for HRMC command level personnel to
derive a percentage of effectiveness figure for HRMC/D mission
accompl i shment .
4. A way to objectively evaluate HRM specialist
performance using standard, specifically defined criteria.
A great deal of data exists throughout the Navy concerning
unit performance. It would seem to be relatively easy and
inexpensive to assemble sufficient quantities of data for a
given performance indicator and to determine HRAV impact
upon specific operational performance by more rigorous
application of the methods offered in this study. Additionally,
it seems that more specific and more direct HRAV impact
could be perceived under one or both of the following
conditions :
a. The HRAV activities were directed to improved unit
performance in some specifically defined area such as
retention or Annual Supply Inspections.
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b. Complete records were maintained concerning
specifically what was done during an HRAV process in a given
unit and what were the observed results. The methodology
offered by this study can be used for either or both condi-
tions following accumulation of sufficient appropriate data.
The direct association between how well the HRAV is
accomplished by HRM specialists and its corresponding impact
on improved unit performance was not completed for this study
because the data on which such an association might be based
were not released. That is, one would have to follow
observable units for some time subsequent to their HRAV
participation. One would have to know exactly what was done
during the HRAV process such that a direct (.or indirect)
cause and effect relationship could be determined.
The unavailability of a sufficient quantity of complete
records limits the conclusions one may draw concerning HRAV
impact to general terminology such as, "It appears that the
HRAV has positive impact." Though perhaps such a statement
is intuitively true, this study has shown that it might not
be absolutely true in all cases or for all performance
indicators. What is needed is an evaluation design and the
permission to use the available data in the design.
Furthermore, though it can be shown that the HRAV has
probable general positive impact on improved unit operational
performance, the lack of specific definition of what
constitutes improved unit operational performance or
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increased unit operational capability limits the conclusions
that can be drawn. Though general conclusions might be
sufficient for some situations, they also seem to be insuffi-
cient for others such as lower level management of the system
on a day-to-day basis.
The question, can be legitimately raised concerning the
worth of attempting to obtain evaluation information of the
specificity called for in this study given that the operating
costs of the HRMC/D's are relatively insignificant. The
answer to such a question is dependent on several
considerations.
a. To what degree is the system accomplishing what it
is designed to do? The answer presupposes that what the
system is designed to do is generally known and accepted in
specific terms. The results of this study suggest that such
is not the case.
b. How serious is the desire to assess the impact of
the system? From the amount of formal and informal research
activity to evaluate the system being done at present, one
can infer that there is a great deal of interest in system
evaluation. However, in this author's opinion there seems
to be a lack of central direction and coordination to the
current research activity. Although organizational relation-
ships are clearly defined in OPNAVINST 5300. 6B [Ref. 4], the
evaluation research efforts that are being conducted
informally by each of the HRMC's seem to be more self-serving
to the respective fleet organizations than to the entire
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system. This can be explained perhaps by the assumption of
different conditions unique to each fleet organization. It
is contended, however, that, since the HRMSS is designed for
application throughout the entire Navy, centralized general
evaluation guidelines could be developed and standardized
for use by all HRMC/D's and modified as necessary for
specific local use as required by local conditions. From
OPNAVINST 5300. 6B, the logical originator of central guidance
and coordination for system evaluation is the OP- 01 P position
on the CNO staff.
c. Is the evaluation effort cost effective? The
effort for this study required six months for completion by
one part time researcher. It is contended that use of the
approach offered in this study can be inexpensive (relative
to the marginal cost of providing HRAV services to each unit),
and it can be done using available in-house resources. The
expertise required to use the methodology is relatively
unsophisticated. Alternatively, the methodology also lends
itself to computer processing to yield general information
on a periodic basis. In addition, the ba-sic approach offered
by this study can be developed more rigorously by one fully
qualified statistician who is also available from in-house
(Navy) personnel assets.
d. How much time will be required? If the assumption
that a typical HRMC can provide HRAV services to approximately
120 units annually is reasonably accurate, it is also assumed
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that those units probably include nearly all the different
command types and conditions in which the HRAV is applied.
It is thought, therefore, that a serious effort of approxi-
mately one year's duration and including all the HRMC/D's
would provide sufficient data to evaluate the HRAV and its
impact.
It is therefore recommended:
1. That the purpose and objectives of the HRMSS be
specifically defined and promulgated.
2. That the effort made to evaluate the system be
guided and coordinated centrally by 0P-01P.
3. That the basic approach offered in this study be
devel oped more rigorously using in-house resources and that
it be implemented, after sufficient trial, throughout the
entire system.
4. That the HRMC/D's be tasked to maintain appropriate
records of their activities in some standard form along the
lines suggested by this study.
5. That whatever evaluation approach is used be
standardized for use by all cognizant parties such that
there is agreement and common understanding among all
concerning what is required.
If these recommendations are followed, it is anticipated
that after sufficient time and serious effort, system
managers will have the information necessary to evaluate the
programs, their effectiveness, their impact, and the
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performance of the personnel who fill the role of HRM
specialist. Additionally, such information can be used to
effect efficient allocation of monetary and personnel
resources, to maintain system policy and procedure currency
with respect to continually changing fleet requirements, and
to predict both individual and unit performance with some
degree of certainty.
It is recognized that the methodology offered by this
study is but a small portion of the research that could be
accomplished with respect to the HRMSS. Interestingly, two
documents already exist that indicate work along the lines
suggested by this study was begun. These are both
unpublished reports entitled respectively:
a. "Proposed Goals and Objectives of the Navy Human
Resource Management Support System." [Ref. 17]
b. "Human Resource Management Symposium," 10-11
January 1976. [Ref. 18]
The first report seems to strive at the specificity called
for by this study, and the document would be a convenient
starting point for specific definition and promulgation of
the system's objectives. The second reoort outlines in some
detail the requirements for operation and evaluation of the
HRMSS on a Navy-wide basis. It, too, provides a convenient
starting point for more rigorous and detailed research.
The following general plan is offered to provide the




a. Fiscal Year 1977
1. Define HRMSS goals and objectives specifically
Synopsis: This research would provide
detailed examination of present goals and objectives, define
requirements specifically, and revise system goals and
objectives as necessary with maximum specificity.
Estimated Requirements:
Time: Two weeks
Personnel: HRMC command level
representati ves
Fleet CINC staff representatives
0P-01P
Pers-6
Cost Factors: Personnel time
Travel and per diem
Location: HRMC San Diego, or NPRDC
2. Develop and Field Test HRAV Evaluation
Rating Questionnaire
Synopsis: Using this study as a basis,
develop a proper evaluation rating instrument to gather
desired information and reduce the possibility of perceptual




Time: Development - 2 weeks
Reproduction and distribution -
2 weeks
Trial period - 6 months
Analysis - 1 month
Modification/Implementation - 2 months
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Personnel : Pers - 6





3. Collect data for impact study in areaCs) of
interest
Synopsis: Using this study as a basis, design
an experiment for rigorous application of the offered
methodology with proper control of variables.
Estimated Requirements:
Time: One year
Personnel: Fleet CINC staff
HRMC/D
Cost Factors: Personnel time
Computer services
Location: The three major fleets and the
shore establishment.
b. Fiscal Year 1978
1 . Analysis of data obtained for impact study
Synopsis: Using this study as a basis and
rigorous statistical analysis techniques, determine the




Cost Factors: Personnel time
Computer services









Cost Factors: Personnel time
Billet assignment opportunity
HRM subspecial ist training
Location: NAVPERS
3. Employment of HRM specialist (Feedback to HRM
School )
Synopsis: This research would examine current
employment of HRM specialists in field commands to determine
the relevance of their initial training.
Estimated Requirements:
Time: Six months
Personnel: HRMC/D command level
Fleet CINC staff
HRM School analysts
Cost Factors: Personnel time
Location: HRM School Memphis
4. Evaluation of source program HRM training
Synopsis: This research would examine whether
what is being taught in access point training conforms to
system goals and objectives, the competence of the instruc-
tors, and the long term affects of this training for personnel









Cost Factors: Personnel time
Data gathering and analysis
Revision of training syllabi
Retraining of HRM instructors
Location: All major access points
Fiscal Year 1980
1. HRMSS change of direction
Synopsis: This research would examine other
areas of potential growth for the HRMSS once the initial
exposure of the entire Navy is complete. It would also






Cost Factors: Personnel time
Research and Development
Location: 0P-01P
2. Decision point concerning system use
Synopsis: No research required. It seems
that this period would constitute a major milestone in the
system's history. The initial job is anticipated to be
completed by this time - that is, all commands will have
experienced at least one HRM cycle. The question then is,





Personnel : OP-01 P
Fleet CINC
Pers - 6




e. Fiscal Year 1981
1. HRMSS redefinition (major overhaul)
Synopsis: Once the initial use of the system
is completed, decisions must be made concerning future use
of the system. If the HRMSS is to remain a useful and viable
tool for the Navy, it seems that it would find application
in other areas of interest. The research done using this
general plan in the previous four year period should provide
ample information on which to base these decisions. Once the
necessary decisions are made, then it is assumed that the










This research plan (summarized in flow chart form in
Figure 7 on the next page) provides only the "bare bones" of
necessary research for the HRMSS
. It is offered as an example
of a structural framework on which system research efforts
could be built for the next five years.




























Other areas of potential research with respect to the
HRMSS are:
a. Aspects of the general N avy envi ronment which may
not be conducive to realization of the goals and objectives
of the HRMSS.
b. Development of appropriate, specific, and standard
HRMSS inspection requirements which are generally applicable
at all 1 evel s .
c. Development of methodology to ensure the profes-
sional competence of personnel returning to billets of normal
duty subsequent to a tour of duty within the HRMSS.
d. Development of an evaluation and a reward system
which ensures that personnel assigned to HRMSS billets remain
promotional ly competitive with their contemporaries who are
assigned to more conventional billets.
e. A study to determine the applicability of HRMSS
evaluation techniques to other essentially socially oriented
areas of Navy endeavor such as personnel selection and
performance assessment.
f. Development of a plan to terminate the HRMSS as an
entity and to incorporate the current system resources into
more normal command channels. This presupposes that the
system has a limited purpose and scope which, when these are
fulfilled, will indicate that the system is no longer
necessary. Though this author does not envision the system
outliving its usefulness for some time yet, the possibility
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in the future (lacking any system
,
growth potential) is worthy
of consideration and preparation.
These few areas of possible further research are meant
to be representative only, and this list is not assumed to
be all inclusive. It is contended, however, that the
necessary personnel assets and expertise are already available
within the Navy to pursue studies in any area of interest
with respect to the HRMSS. Assuming seriousness of purpose,
central guidance and coordination, maintenance of appropriate
records, common understanding and cooperation among all
cognizant parties, specifically defined goals and objectives,
and access to data, it is both possible and feasible to prove
that the HRMSS can and is realizing its great potential to




Exhibit 1 - HRAV Evaluation Questionnaire
(Commanding Officer Form)
Exhibit 2 - HRAV Evaluation Questionnaire
(HRMST Form)
Exhibit 3 - Letter of Request to HRMC Commanding Officer




HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SUPPORT SYSTEM
PROCESS EFFECTIVENESS QUESTIONNAIRE
Please answer all questions in the enclosed question-
naire. All questions ask to what extent you think various
aspects of the Human Resource Management Support System
were performed effectively within your command during the
Human Resource Availability [HRAV) recently participated
in by your command.
This questionnaire is designed to help us to maintain
our services such that they are always responsive to the
realistic concerns of commanding officers and also in
keeping with the spirit and intent of the Navy Human Resource
Management Support System.
Please signify your answer to each of the questions by
marking the appropriate box. Additional space is provided
for you to make any added comments you desire.
137

HUFAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROCESS EFFECTIVENESS QUESTIONNAIRE
As a, result of all associated HRAV activities (from initial visit
•ough HRAV), to what extent did you have a clear understanding and















As a result of all associated HRAV activities, to rhat extent did
.
have a greater a^nreciation for how the HRAV could be used to













To what extent do you think the Human Resource Management Su^ort
m (ITPJ"ST) assigned to your command -provided you appropriate pnd













To what extent did the feedback of survey data you received
icate a thorough examination of the data and reasonable















To ""hat extent did the
r command conform with
apement Sunnort System
actual HRAV activities conducted within
















1) what extent did the HRAV activities conducted within your
rrrmd lead to results you had been led to expect by the Navy Human













1) what extent do you think your Command Action Plan, developed
£ result of your command's participation in the HRAV will nroduce














1) vhat extent was the scheduling of all associated HRAV activities
aiial visit through HRAV) flexible enough to accommodate your













1) what extent do you think the members of the assigned HRMST














'o T'hat extent do you think your command's participation in the

















t-ttjtan ^SOURCE MANAGEMENT ^OCESS EFFECTIVENESS OUESTIONNAIRE
(Form 2: for use by the HRTST leader)
To '"het extent did assigned HRMST members attempt to ensure that
i narticina.ting unit GO (and other appropriate unit -personnel) had
louate understanding and appreciation of the concents of the Navy
jan resource Management Su-n^ort System and what ^articination in













To vhat extent ras assignment of HEMST members made with resnect













Po vhat extent did you as HRMST leader concur vith purvey analysis















?o '"hat extent did assigned team members attempt to ensure that
i- r activities conducted were in conformance vith the objectives of













'o "'hat extent "'ere expected HRAV activity results achieved















i, 'o what extent do you think the skills necessary for continuing
f4ctiveness in problem identification and solution '"ere transferred













o '"h°t extent vera attempts made "by assigned TTRTr<^ ri ~pt~>vnpt»c j-o
Wu7 e associated. HRA.V activities to oreom-odate the nartic? mating
viy p normal onerating requirement s/routine TFTith minimum di rr,, ^t-; on?












'o —hat extent dirt assigned HRITST members exert their efforts to
u*ibrt the participating unit's desires/^erceiv^ needs in addition















j=5 a result of its participation in the HBAY, to what extent do














o what extent do you think active participation of the unit
ntd other designated anpronriate -personnel contributed to the















13 . If your HWST vere to be assigned another unit of the ^np
tyne ps this, vhat would you do differently? "Please pyniain.
f









I-T Raymond C. Highsmith
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
Commanding Officer
U.S. Navy Human Resource
Management Center
U.S. Naval Base, Pearl Harbor
FPO San Francisco, Calif. 96610 14 April 1976
Dear Captain,
As my postgraduate school thesis project, I am attempting
to determine a way to assess the impact of the HRAV in those
operational units in which it is conducted. The work done so
far has produced two companion questions:
1) How can re know that the HRAV was done veil?
2) v"hat is the impact of the HRAV in the unit with respect to
recognized bonifide navy management issues?
Providing an approach to answer the second of these
ouestions will be the major thrust of the thesis. Though the
purpose of this letter is to ask your assistance in answering
the first question, it is hypothesized that providing a way to
answer the second will close the loop in evaluation of the entire
HEM cycle. This will be done by examining unit performance in
such areas as retention, non- judicial punishment rates, Annual
Supply Inspection scores, etc.
Enclosed, please find several copies of t^o forms of a
questionnaire I have developed to assess how well an HRAV is
done. It is envisioned that the two Questionnaires wil 1 be
used ps a set, vith the participating unit commanding officer
completing one and the HRFST team leader completing the other.
The results of the t ,-To Questionnaires will then be compared
and correlated with reported operational data. It is
anticipated that completion of the forms will yield, the
following results:
a) A measure of effectiveness for how well the HRAV was
done
.
b) A way for HRF specialists to determine the strengths
and weaknesses of the work the -" do.
c) A way for FRTC command level personnel to derive a
percentage of effectiveness figure for HRI.rC,/D mission
accomplishment
.
d) A way to objectively evaluate ERH specialist
effectiveness and competence via standard criteria.
The tvo Questionnaires ask essentially the same Questions
in the same order on both forms* however, the focus of the
ouestions is different iv. each, attempting to reflect possible
differences in ^erce^tion rind, biases of the two parties (i.e.
HRFC/D on the one hand and the participating unit commanding
officer on the other). The hypothesis here is that the answers
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to the questions on the tv:o forms rill not "be very different.
If the answers are significantly different, the assumed
indication is that these are areas which night hear closer
examination.
The form for the rarticinating unit commanding officer
attempts to view the situation from his unioue position. It
is assumed that he is concerned only with the best interest of
his command - regardless of what the Human Resource Management
Support System and/or the assigned specialists think are his
best interests. It is readily seen that this particular
ouestionn.aire olaces a large measure of the ""burden of proof"
onto the HRJ,:C/D specialists.
The form for the HHMST team leader assuir.es that his
broader view and knowledge of Policy concerned with the Human
Resource Management Support System makes his evaluation of a
particular HRAV effort more meaningful than that of the
assigned lead specialist. That is to say, he is in a more
advantageous position to assess the effectiveness of what work
is done by the specialists in a given command. Additionally,
this form provides for possible differences in perception
between the participating commanding officer and the HRMC/D
specialists (i.e. though the specialists thought they did an
effective job, the -participating commanding officer might have
thought otherwise: or, alternatively, the specialists ma?/, in
fact, have done the best nossible job, but the command with
whom they worked was not particularly sun^ortive of the effort).
The questions in both forms were developed by me based on
my nearly three years experience as an HRT.1 specialist assigned
to HRKC Norfolk. I have tried to capture the essence of the
HRAV process while simultaneously attempting to keep the number
of questions small so as not to burden either commanding
officers or HRFST team leaders with a great demand on their time.
The questions are designed, to stand alone without the need for
clarification. However, a narrative Question has been added to
each to make the answers to the basic Questions more specifi-
cally and immediately useful to HRTC/D personnel concerned
with process evaluation and improvement.
It is unknown at this ->oint in time what the relative
weights of the questions are. It is therefore anticipated that
I will need to come back to you and your staff for a brief
session of assigning appropriate weights to the questions once
the data are in. It is envisioned that the scoring method
finally adopted vill be uncomplicated, such that this ty^e of
evaluation can readily be done "in-house" without the necessity
of expensive and sophisticated models.
The confidentiality aspect of the Human Resource Manage-
ment Sir-^ort System is fully recognized and appreciated. The
cuestions were designed with that in mind. Though I could be
wrong, I do not think anyone's confidence will be violated, by
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completing these nuestionnaires. On the other hand, the questions
rere desired to be rather "hard -hittins" in order to fulfill
my desire to build a system with which Human Resource Management
Surmort System management -personnel can evaluate their efforts
tangibly and meaningfully,
I have covered a great deal of background before getting
to the "ooint. T Ty reouest is that you use these nuestionno.ires
for the next few months on a trial basis with units scheduled
to participate in an KRAV, having the participating commanding
officer and the assigned HEKST team leader complete their
applicable portions. Upon completion of as many forr.s as
possible in the available time frame, I ask that you return the
completed documents to me at one of the addresses indicated
below. I ask further that each set of Questionnaires returned
be identified as a set through some system of marking such as
A - A, B -B, etc., or 1 - 1, 2-2, etc.
I ask, also, that the questionnaires be tried both on
immediate completion of the KRAV and (in selected cases) in
some units approximately one month after completion of the
HRAV if possible. The reason for this is that it is unknown
either how time-oriented this information is or whether or not
a time perspective of, say, one month will yield more meaning-
ful results. Please identify those sets of
.
questionnaires
which are completed some time after the HRAV in this fashion.
It is reouest ed that all completed forms be returned to
me not later than 1 August 1976. I ~>lan to complete my thesis
by 1 November 1976 and will provide you a copy of the finished
document.
Should you have any ouestions concerning this effort, I
can be reached as follows:
IT Raymond C . Highsmith









Ca-ntain Baldwin of Pers-6 is aware of this project, though
not of the specific form it is tricing. Additionally, ;this
effort parallels, to some degree, vork being done by the U.S.
Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego.
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Fy thesis cdvisors are CDR R.A. McGonigal and LCI5E R.I.
Forbes, both of rhom are fully experienced in the HRAV process,
and "both of vhom have had a long association vrith the Human
Resource Kanagement Su^-nort System.
These cuestionnaires have "been released informally to
save tine; hovever, the?/ '-ere released with the kno\"ledge of
my thesis advisors and other appropriate personnel of the
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.
I apologize for the extraordinary length of this letter,
and I appreciate your time in reading it. Thanking you in
advance for your effort in support of this project, I remain,
Very Respectfully, /






Exhibit 1 - Data and Calculations for Returned Completed
Sets of HRAV Evaluation Questionnaires
Exhibit 2 - Data and Calculations for Retention Rates of
Selected COMNAVSURFPAC Units
Exhibit 3 - Data and Calculations for Annual Supply







P.aw Data Prom HRAV Evaluation r uestionnaires
SET r UT,STIONTTAIPE A1TSWEPS a HRL'/CO TOTAL





-j 7 8 Q 10
SCORE
HPJI/CO
1 5/5 3/5 5/5 5/5 4/5 2/5 5/A 5/5 2/5 4/4 35/43
2 A/A 1/3 4/4 A/
A
a/5 a/ 3 4/3 A/A 3/A 3/3 31/33
7 5/4 1/5 5/4 5/5 aTa 4/5 5/4 5/5 A/5 A/
A
37/40
4 4/5 1/5 5/4 5/5 4/5 4/4 5/4 A/5 3/5 5/4 35/41
5 5/4 1/4 5/4 R/A 5/5 A/
A
5/4 5/5 3/4 5/5 3c1 /V6
6 5/3 5/4 5/4 4/3 5/A 5/3 5/A 5/5 5 /5 5/A 44/34
7 3/5 1/4 4/5 A/5 A/A A/A 4/5 3/5 3/5 3/5 29/42
8 5/1 1/1 5/2 5/1 4/4 A/1 5/3 5/3 3/3 5/1 37/17
4/4 1 /A 4/3 5/4 A/A 3/5 5/A S/A 3/3 A/A 33/35
10 4/5 i /3 4/4 A/5 A/5 A/4 A/A 2/5 2/5 2/4 27/39
11 5/4 1/4 5/4 VI
3
5/A 5/4 5/A 5/3 a/5 4/4 38/36
12 A/A 3/3 A/4 A/2 4/5 3/3 5/2 A/4 A/4 4/2 3A/2Q
13 4/5 3/4 4/5 5/5 4/5 4/4 A/A 5/5 3/5 4/A 36/41
14 A/A 1/4 5/5 5/4 3/4 4/3 5/2 5/5 2/5 3/2 32/33
15 5/5 5/4 5/5 5/0 5/5 4/5 5/0 5/5 4/5 A/3 42/32
16 5/5 2/5 5/4 5/4 A/5 4/
4
5/4 5 /5 3/5 a'/ 3 ^7/^0
17 5/4 3/4 5/4 5/4 5/4 3/3 5/3 5/4 2/5 5/3 3S/34
18 5/4 3/5 5/5 5/4 5/5 A/4 5/1 5/4 3/5 5/A 40/3°
19 5/4 5/4 A/4 4/4 A/4 5/A 5/3 5/4 3/a a/ 3 39/34
20 5/4 1/5 A/5 5/4 5/A 4/4 5/5 5/5 4/5 5/4 38/40
21 4/4 5/5 5/4 5/2 4/5 A/5 5/4 5/4 3/5 5/4 40/38
22 4/4 5/5 4/5 5/5 A/A A/A A /A A/4 3/5 A/A 37/40
23 5/4 3/5 5 /A 5/4 3/4 3/4 2/4 3
^
3 3/5 5/4 35/38
24 5/5 3/5 5/5 5/5 5/5 A/A A/5 5/4 a/5 5/4 41/43
25 4/4 4/4 4/4 5/4 A/A 3
^
3 A/A 4/5 3/5 4/5 35/37
26 5/4 3/4 5/5 5/5 5/A 5/4 5/4 5/3 a/5 5/A 42/^Q
27 5/4 4/5 l5/5 5/4 4/5'
'




The total scores in the table above reflect elimination of
questions number 7 and 8 from the HRI/IST and commanding
officer Questionnaires respectively. Comparison of individual
Question answers should not be attempted from table 3-1
because the subject matter of Questions with the same number
on both forms is different, (see A.ppendix A)
148

HRAV Evaluation Questionnaire Regression Analysis Calculations
[Ref. 19]
n X Y XT X z Y x
1 35 43 1505 1225 1849
2 31 33 1023 961 1089
3 37 40 1480 1360 1600
4 35 dl 1435 1225 • 1681
5 38 3b' 1444 Iddd 1444
6 dd 34 ld06 1036 1156
7 29 42 1218 841 1764
8 77 17 62° 1360 289
q 33 35 1155 1089 1225
10 27 3 a. 1053 720 1521
11 38 ^6 1368 Iddd 1476
12 ^d 29 986 1156 843
13 ^6 dl ld76 1206 1681
Id 32 33 1056 102d lo^o
15 d2 32 1344 1764 1024
16 ^7 "5Q 1443 1369 1521
17 38 3d 1292 Iddd 1156
18 40 39 1^60 16^o 1521
10 ^0 34 1326 1521 1156
20 38 do 1520 Iddd 1600
21 40 3d 1520 1600 Iddd
22 37 dO i^eo 136° 1600
23 35 38 1330 1225 Iddd
2d 41 43 1^63 lool 1849
2R 35 37 7?QR 1 OOP 1^6°
26 42 ^Q 1638 176d 1521
27 40 44 1760 1600 1936
tot a;b 990 99s 36595 36714 37846
Table B-2
In Table B-2 above, X represents the total score obtained
on the HRMST questionnaire. Y represents the total score
obtained on the corresponding commanding officer question'
naire. XY is the product of the two corresponding scores
2 2
X and Y are obvious.
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HP.AV Questionnaire Regression Analysis (continued)
From basic statistics it can be shown that:
Mean value of X is X







Mean value of XY is XY











Total XY - nXY
Total X - nX*
Yc = a + bX
and
36595 - 27x1355.32




a = Y - bX
a = 36. oe - ( .0C33)(36.67)
a = 36.8390 = 36.84
Therefore
:
Y„ = 36. 84 + .0033X
The snail value of the slope (b) indicates a "flat" slope
for the recession line calculated above to describe the
plotted pairs of -ooints in figure 6 of the text. Th c flat
slope, in turn, indicates little correlation between the




HP.AV Questionnaire Correlation Test
For a flat slope, the corresponding coefficient of
correlation (r) "between values of X and Y should be close
to a value of zero.
It can "be shown that the coefficient of correlation i:
given by:
a x( Total Y) + b x( Total XT) - nY*
r =
Total Y z - nY*
and using the calculated values for the variables shown in
table B-2 and on the last page, we have:
(36.839x998) + (.0033x36595) - 27x(36.96) ;i





Therefore, the supposition of little correlation between
the two sets of scores is verified.
Standard Error of the Estimate
That the regression line Y = 36.84 + .0033X provides the
best description for the plotted points can be verified by
calculation of the standard error of the estimate Sy. x .
It is anticipated that Sy. x will have a small value if the
regression line provides a good "fit" for the plotted points.
It can be shown that:
_
i_









Chi Sruare Test for HRAV Fffectiveness Rating
Competing hypotheses:
H0: The comparison of total scores obtained from completion
of evaluation ouestionnaires by commanding officers and
HRKST team leaders at the end of an HRAV will show no
material differences in perceptiors of the two parties.
Hi: The comparison of total scores ... will show material
differences in the perceptions of the t T ' -o parties.





Commanding Officer S cores ( Total^
16-20 26-30 31-35 36-^0 41-45 Total
HEMST 26-30 Q r\ 1 1 r*
Scores 3] —35 1 3 2 8
(Total) 36-40 7_ q 2 QC 13
41-45 r\ 1 1 A
Total 1 1 7 12 rQ 27
able 3-3
Since ,,T e are interested in determining whether the hypothesis
of no material difference in total scores is tenable, ,v e
proceed to calculate the ecpected frequencies Toy assuming
that the null hypothesis (H ) is true.
From the totals of Table B-3 above in the right ^.?nd-
column, we observe that 2/27 = 0.074$ of the HREST total
scores ^ere in the 26-30 range.
If Eq is true: that is, if there are no material
differences in the scores obtained by commanding officers
and HEMST team leaders, then it shoulf also be true that
2/27 = 0.074$ of the commanding officers, whose total scores
are in the 16-20 range, ^ Till correspond to HRMST's -hose
total scores are in the 26-30 range; 2/27 of the commanding
officers -hose total scores are in the 26-30 range should
correspond to HRTST's whose total scores were in the 26-30
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range; 2/27 of the commanding officers whose total scores
are in the 31-35 range correspond to HEFST's whose total
scores are in the 26-30 range, etc.
From this reasoning we can construct a table of expected
frequencies by using the general rela.tion:
*e






is the expected frequency
Total row (i) is the total of frequencies in the
i-th row.
Total column ( j) is the total of frequencies in the
Jth column
Grand Total = n = 27
Applying this relation
,
we obtain the expected frequencies
shown in Table B—4 below.








16-20 26_3n 31-35 36-40 £1-45 Tet^ 1
9 5 _ 1 Q .0741 0*7/ 1 . * 1 8 6 p 8 q 2 .A/LA6 9 .OOOfi
71 _7^ .° c c^ .2^6^ 2 . nr?£l 3.5556 1.7778 8.onoi
36-40 .4815 .4815 7 m ~i v n & 5.7780 2.88°0 13. (X o/i
43 -45 .1481 .14.81 1.0V70 1.7772 .8886 7 ,0000
Total i.oooo 1.0000 7.0001 |L2.0' ^0 -.0000 27.0001
mTable B-4
How great a difference between total scores of
commanding officers and HPJ'TST team leaders can be tolerated
before we reject the hypothesis that there will be no
material differences in the t ,,r o scores?
T
"e use the Chi Square test to answer this nuestion by
comparing the observed freouencies with the expected
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frequencies derived under the assumption of the truth of
the null hypothesis. It can be shown that the Chi Souare
test is riven by the relation:
X* = Total





f is the observed frequency
f e is the expected frequency
The computed value of 'X takes on different values from
sample to sample. Therefore, we wish to know, "Is the
computed value of X so large that we are required to reject
the null hypothesis (H ) that there will be no material
difference in total scores obtained by commanding officers
and HPI'ST team leaders on evaluation questionnaires
completed after an KRAV by both parties?" That is, are the
aggregate discrepencies between the observed and expected
frenuencies so large that we are unwilling to attribute
them to chance, sr.d. therefore be forced to reject the
null hypothesis?
To arj-nly the Chi Square test ,,T e must know the number of
de.?rees of freedom (df).
It can be shorn that for any table of the form of Tables




r is the number of rows in the table
c is the number of columns in the table
In our case, df = (4-1) (5-1) = 12.
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Performing the necessary calculations, we obtain the
following tables:
fo fe f - f (f - fe
>* (f
- *ef/*e
.0741 - .0741 .0055 .0742
.2963 - .2063 .0878 .2°64
1 .4815 .5185 .2688 .5583
.1481 - .1^81 .0219 .1479
.0741 - .0741 .0055 .0742
1 .2 G 63 .7037 .4952 1.6713
.4615 - .4815 .2318 .4814
.1481 - .1481 .0219 .1479
.5186 - .5186 .2689 .5185
3 2.0741 .°25Q .8573 .4133
2 3.37 n 4 - 1.1704 1.3698 .4064
2 1.0370 .°630 .027^ .8943
1 .8892 .1108 .0123 .0138
2 3.5556 - 1.5556 2.41°° .6806
8 5.7^80 2.2220 4.9373 .8545
1 1.7772 - .7772 .6040 .3^°9
1 .4446 .5554 .3085 .6030
2 1.7778 .2222 .0404. .0278
2 2.8890 - .8800 .7903 .2736
1 .8886 .1114 .0124 .0140
!7 27.0001 .1999 X 2- = 8.5821
Table 3-5
Thus the computed value of "X^is:
X Z = TotalUfo - f e )/fe) = 8.5821
The number of degrees of freedom is df =12 (as calculated
above)
.
From tabulated values of X1 in Ref . 16 we find that the
critical value of X2 at the 0.01 level of significance is
26.217. This means that if H is true, the probability of
observing a X2 value greater than 26.217 is 0.01. Or, in
other terms, if total scores of commanding officers and
HRJ/IST team leaders obtained on evaluation auestionnaires
completed after an HRAV are not materially different, an
aggregate discrepancy between the observed and expected
freauencies larger than a X2 value of 26.217 would occur
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only one time in 100.
The decision rule for our case can thus be stated:
1. If X? > 26.217, reject H
2. If X i 26.217, accent H
Since the computed value of
~X.
Z
= 8.5821 is less than
the tabulated critical value of 26.217 at the 0.01 level of






Retention Data and Calculation of Normalized Retention Scores
for a Random Sample of 26 Units Under the -Administrative
Control of Commander Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Pacific
Fleet.
The periods of observation are as follows:
a. Quarter 2, Fiscal Year 1975
Quarter 3, Fiscal Year 1975
Quarter 4, Fiscal Year 1975
d. r u?rter 1, Fiscal Year 1976
e. r u-?rter 2, Fiscal Year 1976
For each "oenod, the following are noted and/or calculated:
a. Number of eligible personnel reenlisted — X
b. Number of units observed - n
c. Mean number of eligible personnel reenlisted for
the entire sample - X
d. (X - X)




g. Total (X - X)*
h. Standard deviation for the sample - S
i. Normalized Retention score - t
From basic 'statistics (Ref. 18) it can be shown that:
Total X
S =





*ith the reasoning above in mind, the next five tables
show the results of the indicated calculations,
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Retention Data and Calculations - Quarter 2, Fiscal Year 1975
Unit .A. X - X (x - x)* t = (X - X)/S
1 20 3.3462 11 ."IQ71 .3056
o 13 - ^.^^-58 13.3503 - .3337
3 22 5.3462 25.5819 .4883
4 5 - 11.6538 135.8lli - 1.0644
5 46 32.3462 1046.2766 2.9543
6 40 23.3462 545.04^1 2.1323
7 13 - 3.6538 13.3503 - .3337
8 17 .3462 • ll co .0316
11 - 5.6538 31.9655 - .5164
10 12 - 4.5538 21.657° - .4251
11 27 10.^462 107.0439 .0450
12 13 - ^.653? 13.3503 - .3337
13 12 - 4.6538 21.6579 - .42 51
14 10 f r a -t OyJ • vJ > _3 v. 44.2731 - .6077
15 7 - °.6538 03.1950 - .8817
16 30 22.3462 400. 7527 2.0410
17 19 2.3462 '5.5047 .2143
18 17 .3462 .11Q9 . n 316
19 5 - 11.6538 135.8111 - 1.0644
20 16 .6538 .4275 .ORQ7
21 10 - 6.6538 44.P731 - .6077
22 - 7.6538 58.5807 - ,6°91
23 7 - ° .£^^8 93.1959 - .8817
24 12 - 4J6538 21.657° - .4251
2^ 14 - 2.6 C 38 7.0427 .2424




X = Total X/n =







S = (Total (X - X)/(n - l))~
S = (2996,8847/25) If = 10.9488
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Retention Data and Calculations — Quarter 3, Fiscal Year 1975
Unit V T (X - X) t = (X - x)Vs
1 7 .4615 .2130 .^2°7
2 17 - ^.^385 30.6750 - .3567
26 3.4615 11.Q820 .222o
4 5 - 17.5385 307.5990 - 1.1296
5 72 ac. 4615 2446.4399 3.1857
6 58 35.^615 1257.5179 2.2840
7 16 - 6.5385 42.7520 - .4211
8 25 2.4615 6.05°0 .1585
o 11 - 11.5385 133.1370 - .7432
10 17 ^,^^85 30.6750 - .3567
11 ^2 9.4615 8^.5200 .6094
12 18 - d t ^^P3 20.5980 - .2923
13 10 - 3.5385 12.5210 .227°
14 13 - 9.5385 cn .Q83 n - .6144
15 11 - li.5^85 133.1370 - .7A->2
16 50 27.A615 754.1340 1.7687
17 31 . 8.4615 71.5970 .5450
18 23 .4615 .2130 .0297
10 14 - 8.5^85 72.9060 - .5499
20 22 .5385 .2900 .0347
21 13 - 9.5385 90.9830 - .6144
22 11 - 11.5385 133.1370 - .7^32
23 11 - 11.5385 133.1370 - .7^32
2A 13 - °.^85 °0.983° - - .6144
25 14 - 8.5385 72.9060 .5^99
26 21 - 1.5385 2.3670 ,0991
Total 586 6026. A618
Tacle 3-7
n = 26
X = Tot o.l X/n =




S = (Total (X - X)/(n-l))~
S = (6026.4618/25)^ = 15.5261
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Retention Data and Calculations Quarter 4, Fiscal Year 1975
Unit X X - X (x - xf | t = (X - XVS
1 n <!5 - 2.6154 6.SA03 .1356
2 19 - 11.5154 134. n176 - , 6022
3 33 2.3846 5.6863 1236
4 24 - 6.6154 43.7635 - .>3430
5 102 71.3846 5095.761] 3, 7010
6 74 33.3846 1114.5315 1.,730a
7 26 - 4.6154 21.3019 - . 23^3




10 21 - °.6154 92.4559 - . 4985
11 £2 11.3846 129.6091 , 5^02
12 24 - 6.6154 43.7635 - .,3634
13 19 - 11.6154 13A.°176 - , 6022
i A 20 - 10.5154 112.6867 - ,550A
15 10 - 11.61^4 1^4.°176 - , 6022
16 62 31.3846 °84.9931 1.,6272
17 40 °.3846 88.0707 ,A866
18 28 - 2.6154 6.8403 - . 1356
19 15 - 15.6154 243.8407 ,8096
20 31 .18*6 .1479 .oiag
21 17 - 13.6154 185. 3791 .7059
22 16 - 14.6154 213.6009 - ,.7576
23 17 - 13.6154 185.3791 7059
2 A 20 - 10.6154 112.6867 .5504
25 22 - 8.6154 74.2512 ,446^




X = Total X/n =





S = (Total (X - X)/(n - l)) a
s = ( 9300.4878/25 )™ - 19.2878
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Ketention Data and Calculations uarter 1, Fiscal Year 1976
Unit X X - X (X - X) t = (X - f )/S
1 5 - 2.0385 4.1555 - .336^
2 6 - 1.0385 1.0705 - .1713
3 a 1.9615 3.5475 .3236
4 6 - 1.0385 1.0785 - .1713
5 21 13.9615 IQA.9235 2.3031
6 26 18.9615 359.5385 3.1280
7 8 .9615 .9245 .1586
8 2 - 5.0385 25.3865 - .8361
9 2 - 5.0385 25.3865 - .8361
10 8 .9615 .9245 .1586
11 6 - 1.0385 1.0785 - .1713
12 2 - 5.0385 25.3865 - .8361
13 6 - 1.0^85 1.0785 - .1713
14 6 - 1.0^85 1.0785 - .1713
15 6 - 1.0385 1.0785 - .1713
16 20 12.9615 168.0005 2.1382
17 7 - .0385 .0015 - .0064
18 2 - 5.0385 25.3865 - .8361
19 4 - 3.0385 9.2425 - .5012
20 5 - 2.0^85 4.1555 - .3363
21 5 - 2.0385 4.1555 - .3363
22 2 - 5.0385 25.3865 - .8361
23 4 - 3.0385 9.2425 - .5012
24 6 - 1.0385 1.0785 - .1713
25 7 . '- _/ <- j .0015 - .C060.




X = Total X/n = 183/26 = 7.0385
Total (X -X)* = 918.6820
^ vl,
S = (Total (X - X)/(n - l)) J
S = (918.6820/25)" = 6.0620
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Retention Data and Calculations - Cuarter 2, Fiscal Year 1976
Unit X X - X (x - x) t = (X - X)/S
1 q - 4.576° 20.G471
.4317
2 ii - 2.5769 6.6404 .2430
3 13 .5769 .3328 .0544
4 11 - 2.5769 6.6404 .2430
5 39 25.4231 646.^340 2.3978
6 50 36.4231 1326.6422 3.4353
7 17 3.4231 11.7176 .3152
8 o - 4.5769 20.°471 .4317
o 8 - 5.5769 31.1018 .5260
10 18 4.4231 19.5638 .4172
11 21 7.4231 55.1024 .7001
12 8 - 5.5769 31.1018 .^260
13 a - 4.5769 20.9471 .4317
14 a - 4.5769 20.0471 .4317
15 7 - 6.5769 43.2556 .6203
16 27 13.4231 180.17°6 1.2660
17 15 1.4231 2.0252 .1342
18 6 - 7.5769 57.4094 .7146
19 5 - ^.5769 73.5632 .«089
20 9 - 4.5769 20.0471 .4317
21 10 - 3.5769 12.7942 .3374
22 7 - 6.5769 43.2556 .6203
23 q - 4.5769 20.9471 .4317
24 15 1.4231 2.0252 .1342
25 IT/ - 6.5769 43.2556 .6203




X = Total X/n = 353/26 = 13.5769
Total (X -X)* = 2810.3604
TT- V*.
S = (Total (X - X)7 (n - l)) ;:
S = (2810.3604/25)^ = 10.6026
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Prom the sample of units shorn in Tables 3-6 through
B-10 a smaller sample ras drawn consisting of six units who
had experienced the HHAV during Quater 3, Fiscal Year 1975
and six units that had not experienced an KEAV over the
entire period of observation. Then, for both sets of units
in the smaller sample, movement along the normal scale ras
calculated. An example serves to illustrate the method used
For Unit number one:
t score (for Quarter 2, Fiscal Year 1975) = .3056
t score (for Quarter 3, Fiscal Year 1975^ = .0297
Movement =
-.2759
The following table shows the results of these calculations
for the reduced sarnie:
HHAV Quarter 2 Qua:rter 3 r uarter 4 Qua:rter 1
Unit to to Fiscal *75 to
Quarter 3 Qua:rter 4 to Qua:rter 2




.1653 — .2007 — .0^54
c. - .0230 .2455 .430° .0717
10 .0684 .1418 .6571 .2586
12 .0414 .0111 - .5327 .3101
10
.5145 .25c 7 .3084 .3077
23 .1585 ,077^ .2047 ,06°-5
Total




3 - .265^ p Qpcn .2000 .3780
4 - .0652 ,7866 .1717 ,0717
5 .2314 » 5153 -1 .
"
5 °7° ,0947
6 .1517 - .,5531 i!3 cr7i !,3073
8 .1269 - , 1386 - .^60 ,4044
18 _ m ^r\7 _ 1653 _ ,7005 1 9" c;
Total
J




Summing over the rovs labeled "Total" for "both groups, we
obtain the following results:
Total Movement Quarter 2, Fiscal 1975 - '"carter 2, Fiscal
1976 is,
HRAV Units + .7099
ITon-HRAV Units - .1843
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Test of Hypothesis Number Two Using Two Way Analysis of
Variance Techniques. [Ref. 20]
Hypothesis Number Two stated that no statistically
significant change would occur in units having participated
in an HRAV as compared to a control group of similar units
that had not participated in an HRAV. It was further stated
in the text that rejection of this hypothesis would indicate
some influence of the HRAV and that a "t" test showing
positive difference would verify that influence.
Because units in the two groups (see Table B-ll) were
selected randomly (with no other criteria than that some had
experienced the HRAV and some had not during the period of
observation) it was thought that the analysis of variance
technique results would be more meaningful if the retention
scores obtained by the selected units in each quarter were
adjusted for unit size. By such adjustment, the inequalities
inherent in comparison of large units with small units would
be eliminated. This adjustment was made by dividing the
number of personnel reenlisted by units in both groups by
the estimated size of the compliment for each unit for each
of the fiscal quarters observed. The estimated complement
















Each estimated complement was then divided by 100 arbitrarily
to make the numbers more reasonable. Using these corrected
estimated complement figures as divisors and the number of
personnel reenlisted as the dividend for each unit in each,
quarter observed, the following table resulted:
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Sub-total 12.36 11.43 6.37 5.76 12.14 8.17 56.23
Totals
for the
T?ble 16.65 23.65 14.76 14.66 19.03 17.47 106.22
Table B-12
Results of Two—way Analysis of Variance
Hean Snuare (time periods) = 0.02433
I'ean Scuare (units ) = 1.378772
Mean Square (group) = 0.8376
Iv'ean Scuare (interaction) = l. c PA2







Data and Calculations for Annual Supply Inspections
The period of observation was 1 September 1974 through
30 April 1976. Twenty -four units were observed, twelve of
whom had participated in an HRAV and twelve of whom had not.
The criteria for selection of the units observed were,
1. That all units had experienced at least two
consecutive Annyal Supply Inspections (ASI's) during the
period of observation, and
2. That the experiment group all participated in an
HRAV some time between the two consecutive ASI's, and
3. That the control group all did not experience HRAV's
either before or during the period of observation.
In the following pages, the data and calculations are
tabulated in the same form as were the data for retention
shown in Exhibit 2. The same calculations are used for these
data as were used for the retention data.
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AST Data and Calculations - HRAV Units First Inspection
Unit Y X - X (x - xf t = (x - xVs
1 90.80 4.79 22.Q441 .6404
2 90.20 4.19 17.5561 .5602
3 97.10 11.09 122.3881 1.4826
4 86.49 .48 .2304 .0642
5 75.60 - 10.41 108.3681 - 1.3317
6 72,58 - 13.43 180. ^649 - 1.7955
7 80.75 - 5.26 27.6676 .7032
8 81,50 - 5.51 ^0.3601 .7366
9 89.16 3.18 10.1124 .4251
10 82.94 - 3.07 0.424° .4104
11 91.56 5.55 30. 8025 .7420
12 en. 40 rT^O 54.6121 T q880
Total 1032.08 615. 4313
Ta"ble B-13
n = 12
X = Total X/n = 1032.08/12 = 86.01





S = (Total (X - X)/(n - l))
S = (615. 4313/II)- = 7.48
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AST Data and Calculations - HRAV Units Second Inspection
Unit X X - X (x - xf t = (x - xVs
1 80.70 - 3.62 13.1044 .5701
2 79.^5 - 4 . 57 20.8849 .7197
3 82.96 - 1.88 3.5344 .2Q61
4 91.00 6.68 44.6224 1.0520
5 85. PO 1.48 2.1904 .23^1
6 74.00 - 10.32 106.5^24 - 1.6252
7 76.79 - 7.53 56.7009 - 1.1858
8 87.30 2,98 8.8804 .4693
c 93.06 8.74 76*3876 1.3764
10 c%10 5.78 ^3.4084 .9102
11 91.46 7.14 50.9796 1.1244




X = Total X/n = 1011.93/12 = 84.32
Total (X - X)
X
- 443.1039
S = (Total (X - "f/( n - 1)Y:
S = (442. 1039/11)" = 6.35
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AST Data and Calculations - TTon-HRAV Units First Inspection
Unit X X - X (X - XT1 t = (X - X ) /s
13 87.53 1.25 1 c^oc— . J ^> — ^ .2111
Id 86.31 .03 .0009 .0051
15 91.23 4.95 24.5 n 2^ .8351
16 7^.00 - °.28 86.1184 - 1.5676
17 87.88 1.60 2.5600 .2703
18 84.48 - 1.80 3.2400 .3 n41
19 82.08 - 4.20 17.6400 .7 n95
20 87.10 .82 .6724 .1385
21 74.84 - 11.44 130.8736 - 1.032*
91.24 a. 96 2d.6016 .8378
23 91.14 A. 86 23.6196 .8209




X = Total X/n = 1035.45/12 = 86.28
= *2
Total (X - X) = 384.9471
_ 2 i
S = (Total (X - X)/(n - l))~
s = (384.9471/11)" = 5.92
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AST Data and Calculations - Uon-HRAV Units Second Inspection
Unit
'
y X - X (X - J.)* t = (X - xVs
13 88.58 1.55 2.4025 .2860
14 85.24 - 1.79 3.2^41 .3303
15 Q1 .50 4. AT 1 a ,9809 .8247
16 85.88 - 1.15 1.3225 .2122
17 00.08 3.°5 15.6025 .7288
18 85.08 - 1.95 3.802 5 .3598
19 91.28 4.25 18.0625 .7841
20 86.18 - .85 .7225 .1568
21 71
. 59 - 15.44 238.3936 - 2.8487
22 89.42 2.^0 5.7121 .4410
23 CO. 72 3.69 13.6161 .6808




X = Total X/n =





3 = (Total (X - X)/(n - l))~
S = ( 323*6867/11) ~ = 5.42
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\SI Data Summary and Unit Movement
HRAV Units
AS I #1 AS I #2 Difference
Unit t Score t Score 'Tlovement)
1 .6404 - .5701 - 1.2105
2 5602 - .7179 - 1.2781
3 1.4826 - .2961 - 1.7787
4 .0642 1.0520 .9878
5 - 1.3917 • 2331 1.6248
6 - I.7055 - 1.6252 .1703
7 - .7032 - 1.1858 .4826
8 - .7366 • 46°3 1.1059
9 .4251 1.3764 .9513
10 .4104 .9102 1.3206
1?. .7420 1.1244 .3824
12 .9880 .8016 ,l p 64
Total -
.1349 1.5719 1 . 6068
ITon-HRAV Units
13 .2111 .2860 .0740
14 .0051 - .3303 .3354
15 .8361 .8247 .0114
16 - 1.5676 - .2122 1.3554
17 2703 .7288 .-585
18 - .3041 - .3598 .0557
lo
-
.7 ori 5 .7841 1.4936
20
.1385 - .1568 .2953
21 - l.°324 - 2.8487 .9163
22 .8378 .4410 .396«
23 .8209 .sec)8 .1401
24 1.4088 .1716 - 1.2372
Total ni en• —.
.
0OO9 no A 2
•
Table 3-17
From the summarized data in the table above, the average
motion in the positive direction for the HRAV units is
greater than that for the non—HRAV units by a factor of
multiplication eqtial to 17.057.
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Using the rav : scores obtained for "both toluds for both
periods of observation, the following table resulted:



















7 A , an
Subtotal 171.50 16°. 05 179. 56 177.49 1^6.58
HRAV Units (continued)



































Subtotal 176*11 171.55 182.73 162.88 178. §6 160.56
Non-HHAY Units ( continued
)















173.36 173.28 146.43 180.66 181.86 182.58 2070.86
Column and Rov? C-rand Totals
3 4 JL 6 7
347. 61 341.50 ^62. 2Q 349.37 340.26 316.14 330.00 342.Q8
Column and He C-rand Totals (continued)
10 11 1 2






Results of Tvo-way Analysis of Variance for table B-18
Mean Square (time periods) = 0.02475
Mean Square (units) = 45.4222
Mean Square (group) = 20.3974
BTean Square (interaction) = 28.3105







AAP - Equal Opportunity Affirmative Action Plan
ALNAV - All United States Navy commands
ASI - Annual Supply Inspection
CA - California
CAP - Command Action Plan
CDR - Commander, United States Navy
CINC - Commander in Chief
CINCLANTFLT - Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
CINCPACFLT - Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
CINCUSNAVEUR - Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe
CNET - Chief of Naval Education and Training
CNO - Chief of Naval Operations
CNP - Chief of Naval Personnel
CO. - Commanding Officer
CTT - Command Training Team
D.C. - District of Columbia
E5 - U.S. Navy Enlisted Personnel, paygrade five
HI - Hawaii
HRAV - Human Resource Availability
HRM - Human Resource Management
HRMC - Human Resource Management Center
HRMC/D - Human Resource Management Center/Detachment
HRM CYCLE - Human Resource Management Cycle
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HRMD - Human Resource Management Detachment
HRM School - Human Resource Management School, Memphis,
Tennessee
HRM Specialist - Human Resource Management Specialist
HRMSS - Human Resource Management Support System
HRMST - Human Resource Management Support Team
HRM Survey - Human Resource Management Survey
IS I C - Immediate Superior in Command
LANTFLT - U.S. Atlantic Fleet
LCDR - Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
Leading HRM Specialist - HRM Specialist assigned primary
responsibility to provide HRAV
services to a given unit
LT - Lieutenant, United States Navy
LTJG - Lieutenant (junior grade), United States Navy
NAVPERS - Bureau of Naval Personnel
NAVY - United States Navy
NJP - Non-judicial Punishment
NPRDC - Naval Personnel Research and Development Center,
San Diego, California
OPNAV - Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OPNAVINST - Instruction orginated by the Chief of Naval
Operations (generally applicable to the
entire Navy)
OP-oiP - Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Human Goals
PHASE II - The U.S. Navy Equal Opportunity/Race Relations
Program
PERS-6 - Office within the Bureau of Naval Personnel
responsible for HRMSS matters
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R.I. - Rhode Island
U.K. - United Kingdom





1. OPNAVINST 5300. 6A, 0P-01P, Subject: Navy Human Goals
Plan; 13 December 1973.
2. Phillips, R. M., CAPT, USN, HRMC Norfolk, VA/Author;
Informal telephone conversation, June 1976.
3. Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet Letter 53Q0:
Serial N004A/3946 to Chief of Naval Operations,
Subject: Human Resource Management Impact Evaluation
,
22 June 1976:
4. OPNAVINST 5300. 6B, 0P-01P, Subject: Navy Human Resource
Management Support System : 10 October 1975.
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Branch, Budget and Forces Summary (NAVSO P-3523),
August 1976.
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13. Marshal 1 -Cornwal 1 , J., Grant as Military Commander ,
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,
M.S. Thesis,
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,
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